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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although 
observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the 
nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events 
portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal 
mechanism [1]. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of 
Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring 
within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report [2] and 
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report [3] found that processes in place at the 
time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk 
implications.  
 
This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory 
Panel (ASAP) [4], “no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when 
anomalies occur.” At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 [5] that NASA “could 
better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than 
continue to depend on lagging indicators”.  
 
These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of 
existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for 
previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired 
behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA‟s system 
safety handbook [6], which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to 
take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for 
the safety of its missions. 
 
It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based 
allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will 
ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. 
1.2 Summary of Accident Precursor Analysis 
The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing 
candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety 
implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to 
other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if 
effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis 
processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an 
improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important 
dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor 
information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-
inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk 
whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is 
limited and rare. 
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The purpose of the APA process is to identify and characterize potential sources of safety 
risk for which indications are received in the form of anomalous events which, although 
not necessarily presenting an immediate safety impact, may indicate that an unknown or 
insufficiently understood potential risk-significant condition exists in the system. Such 
anomalous events are considered to be potential accident precursors because they signal 
the potential for more severe consequences that may occur in the future, due to failure 
mechanisms that are discernible from their occurrence today. Their early identification 
allows them to be fully scrutinized and the results to be used to inform decisions relating 
to safety. Stemming from the anomalous event that was actually observed, the NASA 
process invokes an “imaginative” aspect to the process using a structured brainstorming 
session to identify similar anomalous conditions which could have more severe 
consequences than the observed anomalous event. In the context of NASA systems, the 
term severe consequences typically refers to loss of crew (LOC), loss of vehicle (LOV), 
loss of mission (LOM), or loss of science (LOS). It is up to the particular program 
employing the approach to define severe consequences appropriate to its objectives and 
apply the technical approach accordingly.  
 
The APA process presented in this document has been applied to earth-to-orbit 
transportation systems and crewed orbital science platforms, although the fundamental 
process steps are valid for other mission classes (e.g., crewed and uncrewed orbital 
platforms, crewed lunar and planetary outposts, deep-space robotic missions, and other 
human space exploration missions), and may be tailored to the specific needs of each 
class. Programs at NASA that have benefited from the APA process presented in this 
document include the Space Shuttle and the ISS. In addition, NASA is continuing to 
exercise a robust terrestrial and solar system satellite and robotic based science agenda 
that could benefit from a systematic APA process. In this case, an accident precursor 
process could provide valuable information to guide the design of future scientific 
missions as well as indicate when corrective actions are required during the mission to 
preclude potential mission-ending failures. Finally, APA plays an important role in 
extending NASA's anomaly management process to provide additional screening and 
assessment of anomalies for their risk significance. 
1.3 History of NASA’s Precursor Program 
In February 2007 the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) hosted a 
“Precursor Analysis Working Group Kick-off Meeting” to discuss the development of an 
Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) process at NASA.  Shortly after, an APA team was 
formed with the intention of utilizing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission‟s (NRC) 
Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) process [7] as a point of departure for the 
development of a NASA-specific process, augmented as necessary based on fundamental 
differences in the nature of the two organizations. In particular, the process presented in 
this document makes use of NASA‟s data-rich environment and is tailored to the high-
performance space systems that the agency designs and operates. 
 
A first version of an APA approach tailored to NASA‟s needs, derived from the NRC 
ASP process and contributions by Dr. Bill Vesely [8, 9], was completed in 2008 [10]. 
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The approach was tested and refined based on a number of preliminary and on-site pilot 
exercises. First, using an early draft of the process, a retrospective APA assessment was 
conducted on the significant Thermal Protection System (TPS) damage and the major 
External Tank (ET) foam loss incidents that occurred prior to Columbia that were 
identified by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board [3]. Second, a number of APA 
working sessions were conducted at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) to serve as pilot 
applications, in collaboration with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station 
programs [11]. Following those pilot exercises, both programs independently conducted 
precursor exercises. 
 
This handbook captures the experiences and lessons learned from the above activities. 
1.4 Handbook Overview 
 
Section 2 - Accident Precursor Analysis Overview, presents a summary background 
and overview of the NASA APA process. This section outlines the sequence of steps 
involved in screening, generalization, grading, risk modeling, and reporting of findings. It 
presents the technical and risk management rationale behind the approach, and the benefit 
that APA brings to risk management. 
 
Section 3 -Accident Precursor Analysis Process Steps, details the sequence of tasks 
required to conduct a full APA cycle. Divided into the following sub-sections; 
 
3.1 - Building a Caseload, addresses the collection of anomaly source data. This 
section touches on the use of existing problem reporting data sources, the use of 
multiple data sources, and the timing of caseload assembly with respect to the 
initial reporting of the anomalies and subsequent investigatory activities. It also 
addresses the use of screening methods to filter out anomalies with little or no 
potential for more severe consequences. 
 
3.2 - Anomaly Failure Mechanism Identification & Generalization, discusses 
the process of extrapolating an anomaly‟s underlying failure mechanism and 
applying it to other circumstances under which it might recur, such as on a 
different sub-system, at a different time, or with a different fault magnitude. It 
also addresses the makeup and conduct of a generalization session. 
 
3.3 - Evidence Gathering, addresses the collection of relevant data to support 
subsequent grading of anomalous conditions, such as typical types of supporting 
information and criteria by which data can be considered relevant to APA. 
 
3.4 - Grading of Anomalous Conditions, addresses the activity of grading each 
anomalous condition as requiring either risk modeling, observation and trending, 
or no further analysis. It also explains the role that evidence plays in determining 
the pathway to which anomalous conditions are graded. 
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3.5 -Observation & Trending, addresses details the activity of identifying 
suitable populations for trending analysis, trending anomaly parameters that may 
signify deteriorating safety levels, and integrating trending results into the APA 
process. 
 
3.6 - Risk Modeling, discusses how scenario-based risk models can be used to 
assess risk significance, and to identify vulnerabilities in the modeled system. It 
introduces a number of importance measures that can be used to generate focused 
recommendations for further analysis and/or testing. 
 
Section 4 - Documentation of Process Steps and Reporting Results, summarizes the 
documentation defined as part of the APA process and various methods of effectively 
communicating results.  
 
Finally, the main body of the Handbook ends with Section 5, Conclusion. 
 
Throughout the document, yellow APA Example boxes illustrate the concepts presented 
in the various subsections in which they arise, in order to communicate a more concrete 
understanding of the material and its practical application. The blue boxes peppered 
throughout the handbook define important APA terms and operations. 
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2 Accident Precursor Analysis Overview 
 
2.1 The Accident Precursor Concept 
 
The Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation, originally proposed by James Reason 
[12], likens a system‟s barriers against severe failure to a series of slices of randomly-
holed Swiss cheese arranged parallel to each other. Each slice could represent a safety 
process, preventative maintenance, a functional redundancy, etc. The holes represent 
latent conditions, possible severe stresses, opportunities for human error, adverse 
environmental conditions, or simply specific subsystem failures. Essentially, the holes in 
the cheese slices represent inherent vulnerabilities in the system to various events and 
conditions, and are continually varying in size and position in all slices. Using the Swiss 
Cheese Model, an accident can be represented as a trajectory through a momentary 
alignment in a set of holes (as shown by the red line in Figure 2-1). In other words, the 
causal failure mechanism can sequentially negotiate these holes thus compromising a 
barrier meant to obviate catastrophe and snowball to a full-blown accident. Whenever a 
failure mechanism manages to make it through one or more holes, but not all, it is 
effectively deflected from continuing to a severe consequence (as shown by the blue line 
in Figure 2-1) and it is cataloged as an anomaly. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 The Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation 
 
An anomaly can make an organization aware of failure mechanisms in the system that 
may, in combination with less favorable circumstances or left unattended for longer time 
periods, lead to a severe consequence. If there is indeed potential for the observed 
anomaly failure mechanism to recur and lead to an accident (i.e. a situation that has more 
severe consequences), then the anomaly may be called an accident precursor. 
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Based on the above definition, we may now recognize well-known examples of accident 
precursors: 
 
 O-ring blow-by at Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) joint locations, prior 
to the loss of the Challenger.  On several occasions prior to the fatal Challenger 
accident, blow-by events were witnessed at SRB field joints. Based on available 
proceedings, there were discussions and meetings after the blow-by occurrences 
on the potential for greater consequences. The conclusions based on available 
knowledge were that there was no potential for significant consequences. This 
observation signified that a failure mechanism was operative in the system 
however the potential for severe consequences was misunderstood. 
 
 Foam loss from the Space Shuttle ET and Space Shuttle TPS debris damage, prior 
to the loss of Columbia.  On numerous flights prior to the Columbia accident, 
foam was observed shedding from the ET and impacting the Orbiter TPS.  On 
several of these occasions the TPS tile was impacted and damaged, but never with 
catastrophic results.  Most notably, STS-45 demonstrated that impacts were 
possible to the wing-leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) TPS panels, 
and that the RCC material could be damaged by the impacts, as shown in Figure 
2-2. These events demonstrated that a failure mechanism leading to TPS damage 
was active on multiple flights, representing a potential for recurrence with a 
greater magnitude. 
 
Anomaly Failure Mechanism (General Definition) 
An anomaly failure mechanism is the principal underlying phenomena or behavior behind an 
anomaly, responsible for the observed off-nominal physical condition or operational behavior 
of the system. 
 
Anomaly 
An anomaly is an off-nominal occurrence or condition (e.g. a deviation outside of certified or 
approved design or performance specifications). 
 
Accident Precursor 
An accident precursor is an anomaly that signals the potential for more severe consequences 
that may occur in the future, due to causes that are discernible from its occurrence today. 
Such an event provides evidence that a failure mechanism is operative in the system and may 
pose a significant degree of risk, given the potential for it to recur with greater magnitude, or 
under less favorable conditions. 
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Figure 2-2 Post-flight Inspection Photos of TPS Damage on STS-45 
 
A well-known example of a precursor in the nuclear industry was the increased rate of 
containment air filter clogging prior to the discovery of significant vessel head erosion at 
the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant [13]. Upon initial review it was believed that the 
cause of the air filter clogs was due to the filter itself and other anomalies not associated 
with the eroding vessel head. It was only after the discovery of vessel head erosion that 
plant personnel understood that the anomalous air filter performance was due to airborne 
material from the eroding vessel head. 
 
Some examples of accident precursor types are: 
 
 A near-miss because of chance or an opportune mitigation.  An example of this 
type of precursor is the Shuttle TPS debris damage as observed on numerous 
flights prior to the loss of Columbia.  On all previous flights critical TPS damage 
did not occur simply by chance that a debris impact of a great enough magnitude 
did not occur in a sensitive location. 
 
 Faults that can become failure conditions without correction.  An example of this 
might be a hairline crack in a fitting which is so small that it causes no leak or no 
loss of component function, but given time and use can grow to the point of leak 
or rupture. 
 
 Unexpected operational behavior.  For example, at times the operational 
environment of space can cause unintended effects to system operation.  An 
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example might be a lubricant which becomes more viscous than expected when 
operating in the temperature and pressure extremes of space and creates a threat to 
system function. 
 
 Reduced maintenance effectiveness.  An example might be a quality inspection of 
a system which over time becomes routine and possibly mundane such that gaps 
in the inspection develop which allow potentially harmful conditions to be 
accepted for flight. 
 
 Unexpected effects from aging of equipment.  An example of this type of 
precursor could be a coolant system where over time the pH of the chemical 
coolant drops as it ages.  This type of observation could indicate that the pH will 
continue to drop and degrade cooling function. 
 
The above examples of precursors and precursor types illustrates that there is no single 
template for describing an accident precursor. The connection between an anomaly and 
the potential for severe consequences can be relatively straightforward, as in the case of 
Columbia, or it can be indirect, as in the case of the Davis-Besse incident. It can relate 
solely to hardware behavior or it can involve human actions as well. The common 
element in all cases is an anomaly that is benign in its current instantiation, but which 
indicates the potential for more severe consequences. 
 
2.2 Accident Precursor Analysis and its Role in System Safety 
 
APA is the process by which an organization evaluates observed anomalies and 
determines if the mechanism at the origin of that anomaly could recur with more severe 
results. There is no one way to conduct APA, but all APA processes should evaluate 
operational experience to identify unrecognized accident potential or underappreciated 
vulnerabilities, so that something can be done about them in a timely manner
1
. APA is 
one analysis method that can be used in system safety to systematically incorporate 
operational data and experience in the overall safety analysis, allowing the prioritization 
of system and operational changes and improvements based on risk and potential risk 
reduction. Precursor analysis is important in that it „teases‟ out information on „emerging‟ 
safety issues using actual system operational experience to risk inform operational and 
system improvements. 
 
The ability to assess the risk and safety implications of off-nominal system behavior is an 
essential part of an effective risk management and safety program, as recognized in 
NASA/SP-2010-580, NASA System Safety Handbook [6]. APA results are used to 
inform updates to the system‟s risk model; this feedback mechanism allows the real-
world behavior of the system to be reflected back into the risk and safety analyses of the 
                                                 
 
1
 “In a timely manner” is a matter to be determined by the organization overseeing the system (as will be 
discussed in subsequent sections) but basically is defined by the end result – which is the avoidance of an 
accident due to a recurring failure mechanism. 
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system.  In this way APA uses examples of off-nominal behavior in a proactive rather 
than a reactive fashion.  The off nominal event is not simply resolved so that operation 
can continue; it is analyzed and used strategically by gleaning information from it to help 
understand and control risk for the future.  As test and operational experience 
accumulates, the APA process helps to support a convergence between the assessed risk 
and its actual as-operated risk. In the absence of an APA process, convergence between a 
risk model and the occurring events and phenomena of the system modeled may occur in 
response to system failure, which for NASA systems is all too often catastrophic. 
 
In order for NASA to conclude that a system is sufficiently safe, the information that 
demonstrates the system‟s ability to meet those levels of safety must be documented. This 
will consist of a consolidated set of technical and programmatic activities and standards 
that define and implement safety processes and requirements, and record operational 
performance, and system and operational changes. The culmination of that information is 
articulated in a case for system safety, or a safety case. An up-to date safety case will be 
expected to demonstrate that operational experience indicates that the system is as safe as 
desired and as claimed. 
 
Figure 2-3 (adapted from [6]) illustrates the flow of information within a program in 
regards to real-world data and modeling efforts. On the left-hand side of the figure the 
real-world information is generated by the system and operational practices and is 
recorded in the form of off-nominal data reports (anomalies, non-conformances etc.). 
This data represents characteristics of the actual performance of the system. On the right-
hand side safety and reliability analyses (Hazard Analysis, Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
[PRA] etc.) are created from performance modeling activities. 
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Figure 2-3  Real World vs. Models Information Flow in the APA Context 
 
An understanding of system risk is developed by constructing the models illustrated in 
Figure 2-3. The structure of those models, as well as the data used to quantify them, 
initially reflects postulated system behavior informed by historical data, which does not 
necessarily correspond to actual system behavior. As the system is operated, APA uses 
operational off-nominal data to provide clues to its actual behavior (insofar as risk is 
concerned), which can be integrated into the model (potentially refining the structure as 
well as the quantification) in order to bring the predicted performance more in line with 
the actual performance. 
 
Operation-informed refinement of the risk model to better represent reality is just one 
aspect of system safety. System safety as a whole depends on several elements including: 
measures taken to assure that systems are designed to effectively meet their intent, that 
the risks they present are identified and analyzed, measures taken to cost-effectively 
improve safety, and that operational procedures are in place to maintain the level of 
assessed safety. Taken together, these elements of system safety form the basis for the 
safety case, namely the information that NASA depends on for its conclusion that the 
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system can be operated safely. Figure 2-4 (as provided in [6]) shows a notional 
representation of the safety claim model. 
 
 
Figure 2-4  System Safety Claim Model 
 
The underlying claims that ultimately provide confidence in meeting the requirements are 
a decomposition of the top-level safety claim. The first claim (Understand Intent) 
declares that the design, mission intent and implementation of the design (including 
procedures) are fully understood. APA includes a “Generalization” phase which, as will 
be discussed later, supports this claim by taking characteristics of known anomalies and 
applying them to other locations within the system and times within the mission; this 
highlights potential failure scenarios that may not have been considered in system design, 
and contributes to overall design understanding.  The next claim (Identify & Analyze 
Risk) states that areas of risk have been identified, risk reduction measures have been 
implemented and that measures to identify departures from the baseline performance are 
in place. APA aids the identification and mitigation of risk by grading the anomalous 
conditions that represent the highest perceived risk potential and recommending them for 
risk modeling.  If an under-appreciated risk is identified it drives programmatic actions to 
better understand the risk and implement risk reduction measures. The final claim 
(Maintain) states that the operator is committed to tracking safety performance and 
adhering to the levels of safety required. APA helps support the claim by identifying and 
prioritizing potential problems that might manifest in the future, based on what the 
system is demonstrating today. APA results are then used to update the system‟s risk 
model thus ensuring that the model is kept up-to date with actual operational occurrences 
of the system.  
 
The safety case is maintained throughout the life of the system and matures throughout 
the lifetime of the program. APA is a continual process that analyzes the potential risk 
implications of anomalous events as they occur; a program of system safety that 
integrates APA demonstrates a commitment to safety assurance. To conclude that a 
system is acceptably safe it is fundamental that there be a process for determining the 
safety implications of off-nominal operational events or conditions, such as anomalies, 
and reflecting them back into the system‟s risk model. 
 
 
 
TOP LEVEL SAFETY CLAIM
This is „how safe‟ we are (or will be), how 
we know it (data, analysis, technical 
argument) and what we are doing to 
ensure it becomes/remain reality.
Understand Intent
We understand the 
design, the mission 
intent and the 
implementation of the 
design
Identify & Analyze Risk
We have identified risk contributors, 
demonstrated risk reduction measures are 
in place, aggregated levels of system risk 
and have measures to identify departures 
from the baseline performance.
Consider Improvements
Further improvements in safety have 
been considered in relation to cost, 
performance and schedule; however 
any benefits gained would not be net-
beneficial to the program.
Maintain
Assurance measures 
are in place to show 
commitment to claimed 
(or required) levels of 
safety.
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2.3 NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Process Overview 
 
APA establishes a systematic process for risk significance-based evaluation of 
operational and test anomalies by: 
 
 Screening observed anomalies for the need to perform an evaluation 
 
 Extrapolation of the anomalous event to other circumstances (anomalous 
conditions) 
 
 Evaluating and grading anomalous conditions for further analysis 
 
 Performing detailed analysis of selected anomalous conditions 
 
Figure 2-5 presents a high-level view of the conceptual framework of NASA‟s APA 
approach, the process steps trace representative routes that an anomaly present in one of 
the “Anomaly Source Databases” (shown in the upper left-hand corner of the diagram) 
may follow as it makes its way through various screens, evaluation, grading, and analysis 
steps.  
 
The process begins with a review of anomalous events as reported in existing databases 
(e.g., Problem Reporting and Corrective Action [PRACA] database), and a screening of 
those events that can be judged by either manual or automated inspection as having no 
practical relationship to any potentially risk-significant condition existing in the system 
of interest. This is necessary to focus the precursor analysis on events of most interest.  
 
Events surviving this preliminary screen, meant to include all but the most clearly non-
risk significant events (to minimize false negatives), are assessed for their causal failure 
mechanisms. These failure mechanisms are then generalized to different circumstances 
under which they might recur in the system, including the possibility of recurrence in 
different subsystems, at different times, or with different fault magnitudes. These 
generalized, postulated occurrences of the anomaly failure mechanism are referred to in 
APA as anomalous conditions, and characterize the potential for the failure mechanism 
that caused the observed anomaly to occur elsewhere in the system, with potentially more 
severe results. Note that Figure 2-5 depicts multiple outputs emanating from the 
“Generalization” step because a number of anomalous conditions may be postulated from 
a single anomaly as a result of the brainstorming activity that takes place during that 
exercise. 
 
 
 
Anomalous Condition 
In the context of APA an anomalous condition is defined as a postulated recurrence of an 
anomaly failure mechanism under circumstances that could result in more severe 
consequences than those that have been previously produced. Such circumstances include 
recurrence in different subsystems, at different times, or with different fault magnitudes. 
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Figure 2-5  NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Process Overview Diagram 
 
Once the Generalization process has been completed for a caseload of anomalies, 
information is gathered regarding the specifics of the anomalous conditions being 
pursued for further evaluation. This activity requires data-mining to investigate related 
engineering documentation (such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis [FMEA], system 
schematics, physics models, test data, etc) and catalogue relevant data to be used as 
evidence in the following Grading exercise. 
 
In order to prioritize anomalous conditions‟ in terms of their potential risk, a triage-like 
process called Grading is utilized. Grading is a judgment-based process applied to each 
anomalous condition to qualitatively assess their potential for producing severe 
consequences. For example, if an anomalous condition details an electrical short, Grading 
might estimate the potential for that short to result in a fire.  This potential is 
characterized by a qualitative scoring of the potential risk called the Potential Problem 
Index (PPI). Anomalous conditions having a low assessed PPI are screened from further 
analysis. Anomalous conditions with an intermediate PPI are deemed to warrant 
continued observation and trending to assure that causally-related anomalies are 
identified, the underlying anomaly failure mechanism is characterized, and that effective 
controls are in place as needed to prevent the failure mechanism from propagating to 
severe consequences. Anomalous conditions with a high PPI are graded for future 
Anomaly  Source 
Databases
Screened In
No Further Action - Low Risk without need for further APA Analysis
Anomaly Evaluation & Grading
Screened
Out
Evidence 
Gathering
Anomalous 
Conditions
Risk Results Reporting To Program 
Development of an Anomaly Caseload
Choose APA-
Relevant Data 
Anomaly Preliminary 
Screen
Grading
Grade the qualitative risk 
significance - potential 
impact to safety
Generalization
Apply the mechanism to 
different circumstances
Risk Modeling - Quantify the risk significance
Observation & Trending - Monitor and trend anomaly recurrence
Analysis of Risk Significance
Recommended 
Further Actions
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evaluation using scenario-based risk modeling in order to characterize the overall risk 
significance of the underlying failure mechanism.  
 
Scenario-based risk modeling [6] may be conducted in the context of an existing system 
risk model, but can expand on an existing model using parametric probabilistic methods 
which associate the failure mechanism with the proper failure mode(s) in the model. In 
cases where the anomaly failure mechanism and the associated failure mode(s) are 
already adequately modeled, the anomaly provides no new risk information except 
perhaps as an incremental update to the statistical frequency of occurrence. Ultimately, 
when the APA process identifies a potentially under-appreciated risk it will catalyze 
action that will improve the understanding of system risk and modify  the design or 
operation of the system as appropriate to address the issue. 
 
The above APA process steps are implemented either by individuals or by group forums.  
Figure 2-6 shows a representation of the process steps and details whether they are offline 
tasks, or performed in group forums.  Additionally, Table 2.1 shows these steps and 
identifies the skill set that the individual performing them should have or that the team 
performing them should collectively possess. 
 
 
Figure 2-6 Timeline of APA Process Steps 
 
The NASA APA process may be applied as soon as there are anomalous events that will 
impinge upon the current or impending operation of a particular system. In some cases 
this may be as early as the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in the development portion 
of the system life cycle. For instance, if the design solution at PDR includes heritage 
equipment from previous NASA programs/projects or even external applications of that 
equipment, the anomalies that have historically occurred on that equipment can be 
evaluated to determine what, if any, risks they portend for the system being designed.  
This is already done to an extent by incorporating lessons learned from historical 
systems; however APA provides the added benefit of generalization which helps to 
extrapolate those lessons learned onto other systems or other scenarios. Once prototype 
subsystems begin testing, usually between PDR and the Critical Design Review (CDR), 
test anomalies can be evaluated to both inform the FMEA as well as integrating the 
results of the APA into system risk models. The combined findings from APA and 
FMEA can, of course, be utilized to effect design changes that may eliminate or mitigate 
unacceptable risks early in the design process when the cost of making those changes is 
relatively low. After the system begins operation, it is prudent to continue applying the 
APA process to root out under-appreciated risks and to identify new risks that crop up as 
time
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the system‟s processes, missions, and operating environments change, or in the case of 
reusable systems, as they simply begin to show signs of degradation due to aging. 
 
The APA process utilizes a graded approach, i.e., the level of effort and detail of the 
analysis is commensurate with the current state of knowledge regarding the risk 
significance of the failure mechanism being analyzed. It leverages existing risk analyses, 
using elements as appropriate and filling in (or, at a minimum, identifying) risk-
significant information gaps. This is accomplished by applying a standard of evidence to 
both qualitative and quantitative assertions relating to the potential of the failure 
mechanism to lead to a severe system consequence, identifying areas of uncertainty  
 
Table 2.1  NASA APA Process Steps and Required Skill Sets 
APA Process 
Step 
Individual or 
Team Activity Skills or Expertise Required 
Choose APA 
Relevant Data 
Individual 
• Familiarity with anomaly reporting system 
• Competency in data mining and data interpretation 
• Moderate engineering knowledge of the respective program 
Preliminary 
Screen for Non-
significant Events 
This is a process step that can be implemented once the subsequent teams define 
the screening criteria 
Generalization Team 
• Familiarity with anomaly reporting system 
• Accident Precursor Analysis expertise 
• Coordination of technical discussion group skills and leadership 
expertise 
• Ability to concisely transcribe the decision and rationale of the 
group discussion 
• Systems engineering experience; comprehensive knowledge of 
system function, operation and system integration 
Evidence 
Gathering 
Individual 
• Competency in data mining and data interpretation 
• Moderate technical knowledge in the relevant engineering field 
• Support provided by subsystem experts as required. 
Grading Team 
• Accident Precursor Analysis expertise 
• Coordination of technical discussion group skills and leadership 
expertise 
• Ability to transcribe the decision and rationale of the discussion 
• Experienced systems engineering skills - comprehensive 
knowledge of system function, operation and system integration 
• Detailed subsystem expertise;  function, operation, failure 
modes & effects, and integration with related subsystems 
Risk Modeling Individual 
• Systems engineering and probabilistic risk modeling expertise 
• Support from subsystem experts as required. 
Observation & 
Trending 
Individual 
• Data interpretation skills 
• Moderate engineering experience in the respective program 
• Support from Systems Engineers. 
Risk Level 
Reporting 
Individual 
•Expertise in the program's 'Safety, Reliability and Quality 
Assurance' processes 
•Knowledge of the program's decision making protocols and 
reporting requirements" 
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where additional analysis, inspection and/or testing may be warranted in order to 
confidently understand the failure mechanism and the associated response of the system. 
This evidentiary standard also applies to existing analyses, to ensure that risk results are 
empirically supported, either by direct statistically significant testing or by the use of 
appropriately baselined physics-based analysis. 
 
For those anomalous conditions that are graded for risk modeling, the main intent is to 
estimate the risk of severe consequences, given an occurrence of the anomalous 
condition, and to identify the drivers of that risk in terms of the physical conditions that 
produce it. This is done by conservatively characterizing the uncertainty in the 
parameters of the system risk model, and determining the parameter values that produce 
the highest risk. This enables decision makers to focus resources to most effectively 
reduce the potential for the system to operate with these values, or to assure that 
operation under such conditions does not present undue risk. 
 
In summary, the basic principles of the NASA APA process are: 
 
 Anomaly data may point to anomaly failure mechanisms that, under 
different circumstances, could result in severe consequences. The prudent 
response to such anomalies is to assess this potential to assure that no unknown or 
underappreciated risks exist in the system. The APA process generalizes from the 
particulars of the observed anomaly to the spectrum of potential failures that share 
the same causal mechanism but which may occur in more severe form, at different 
times, or in different locations. 
 
 Use of a common risk measure.  APA provides a broad review of all anomalies 
and utilizes a common risk measure over the full range of anomalies.  This 
assures consistency in the management and disposition of risk issues arising from 
the APA process. 
 
 An efficient APA process depends on a graded approach.   Anomalies are 
assessed by screening, qualitative assessment and quantitative modeling. 
Quantitative modeling is used only as needed to understand the system risk 
attributable to the failure mechanism. 
 
 The process is based in evidentiary support. Anomaly failure mechanism 
generalization involves the postulation of fault magnitudes, propagation pathways 
and system stresses that may not have occurred within the operational experience 
base of the system. Thus, uncertainties are potentially large and care must be 
taken to avoid mischaracterization. The APA process explicitly weighs the 
evidence that is used to support the characterization of risk, implying where 
additional testing or analysis may be beneficial. 
 
 The focus is on identification of underappreciated risks. Anomalies are 
significant to the extent that they either imply performance degradation of well-
understood elements or reveal risks that were underappreciated or misunderstood 
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prior to the anomaly occurrence. APA makes use of existing risk models to 
ascertain the risk significance of the failure mechanism, and entails additional risk 
modeling as needed to understand the physical drivers of that risk. 
 
 The APA process is designed to produce actionable findings. It is expected 
that the findings will be available to the risk management system to support the 
development of risk-informed recommendations for system operation and testing, 
as well as assessing the adequacy of any corrective actions that may already have 
been taken in response to the original anomaly. Therefore, top-level metrics that 
measure the risk importance of the underlying anomaly failure mechanism, as 
well as the associated physical parameters that may contribute to a catastrophic 
exacerbation of that mechanism, are fundamental to the process. 
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3 Accident Precursor Analysis Process Steps 
 
3.1 Building a Caseload 
 
The APA process begins with the compilation of an anomaly caseload, collected from 
reports of anomalous events which occurred within the system under evaluation. It is 
these reports which are used as the initial indicators by which precursor analysis is 
conducted and underappreciated risks may be identified. At a minimum, the caseload 
should be a set of actual events that occurred during system operation that reveal an 
anomaly in the physical characteristics or behavior of the system. Within large systems 
such as the Space Shuttle or ISS, a correspondingly large number of anomalous event 
reports or event reporting systems may exist. In this case, it is the job of the precursor 
analysis team to assemble all of the reported data, filter out that which is not of value to 
the analysis process, and leave a refined, manageable set of significant and valid data to 
evaluate. 
 
3.1.1 Data Sources of Interest 
 
Typically, anomalous events are reported through a problem reporting process where a 
technician or mission operator will observe an anomaly and provide a description of the 
event. Information regarding the anomalous event is then entered into a database to be 
used at a future date. Event reports for use with APA should at a minimum contain a 
short title and a description of the anomaly as it was observed, time and date information 
of the anomaly occurrence, as well as some descriptive element which sheds light onto 
the causal failure mechanism of the anomaly. Typically much more information will also 
be available, some of which may help to adequately characterize and classify the event 
that was observed. Some common types of information which may be recorded in an 
event report are the system and subsystem in which the anomaly was observed, 
engineering contacts responsible for the system, remaining controls against potential 
failures and the potential consequences of such failures (by referencing a FMEA for 
instance), and links to outside documentation on the component(s) that experienced the 
anomaly. For the purposes of APA, it is important to choose anomaly data sources that 
contain a maximum of information relevant to the identification of anomaly failure 
mechanisms, controls preventing system failure, and potential consequences of failure. 
 
3.1.2 Choosing Accident Precursor Analysis Relevant Data 
 
Since the APA process is concerned with finding underappreciated risks which could 
result in severe consequences, it is important for the anomaly data source to minimize the 
inclusion of reports documenting conditions of negligible risk. For example, anomalies 
discovered during acceptance-testing prior to system operation document non-
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conformances within operationally-certified systems, but represent the testing system at 
work, preventing the non-conformances from being accepted for nominal use where they 
may cause failure. Conversely, records which document events reported during system 
operation demonstrate failure mechanisms which passed through the rigors of acceptance 
testing, and thus demonstrate discernable potential threats to safe system operation during 
flight or system operation. Additionally, events reported during testing of a design that is 
approaching its final design configuration can demonstrate the ability for failure 
mechanisms to manifest themselves in flight-like hardware, and should be viewed as 
potential threats to safe operation. For this reason, it is recommended that the anomaly 
data pulled for APA be limited to anomalies that occur on systems approved for operation 
or operation-like testing. If time and resources allow, further examination of anomalies 
cataloged outside of system operation (i.e. acceptance testing, fleet leader failures, etc.) 
could be considered as well. 
 
 
 
If multiple data sources are available that contain records of unique anomalies, then a 
combined data set may be created and used as a dedicated APA database. Equivalent or 
very similar fields from the original databases can be grouped together for the APA 
database, but unique fields from each database should be preserved in the combined set, 
ensuring that the combined database contains all information from the original sources. 
The diagram in the following Space Shuttle example shows this concept in practice, when 
fields from two databases were combined to make a comprehensive database.  The end 
objective of this step is to establish a single list of anomalies for the deliberative process 
Space Shuttle Example 
 
In the Space Shuttle Program, anomalies are recorded in different repositories or with 
different designations and resolved in accordance with different processes, as appropriate to 
the specific anomaly, such as in the Space Shuttle PRACA system. PRACA-reportable 
anomalies occurring on flight hardware or software during a mission phase of the system 
lifecycle that meet certain criteria for immediate attention are designated as in-flight 
anomalies (IFAs) and their disposition is reviewed by the Program Requirements Control 
Board (PRCB) prior to the next flight. This is in contrast to PRACA-reportable anomalies as a 
whole, which tend to be of a more test-oriented and maintenance-oriented nature and do not 
necessarily warrant an in-depth assessment prior to the next flight. Generally, the information 
recorded in the PRACA system allows areas in need of correction or improvement to be 
remanded to engineering for development of a corrective action, if deemed necessary. 
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3.1.3 Timetable for Evaluation of Anomaly Data 
 
Often when anomaly reports are initiated only some core information is recorded and the 
rest is filled in as information is gained about the condition (e.g. from a root-cause 
analysis) or after a corrective action is put into place. Accordingly, consideration should 
be given to the time at which the anomaly source data will provide the most value to the 
APA process. For example, given the process‟s emphasis on generalizing from the causal 
mechanism, it is valuable to wait for a causal analysis to be performed on the anomalous 
event if one is indeed planned. It will not always be possible to wait for a causal analysis 
to be completed on all anomalies in a data set; however, it is suggested that any steps that 
improve the understanding of the underlying failure mechanism be accomplished before 
the anomaly is evaluated as part of the APA process. It should also be understood that 
there is a risk associated with any delay in applying APA, since it might extend the 
window of opportunity for the failure mechanism to reassert itself and result in severe 
consequences. In actual applications for both the Space Shuttle and ISS programs, the 
process worked well when performed approximately six months to one year after the 
most recent anomaly in the data set. Given that amount of separation time, few records 
lacked the investigative background information to proceed with the process, or the 
causal information to identify the anomaly failure mechanism.  Ultimately, however, the 
decision of when to apply the process must be tailored to the specific program conditions, 
in order to balance the need for a more complete understanding of the risk-significance of 
the anomaly against the risk of the underlying failure mechanism recurring with more 
severe consequences. 
 
Space Shuttle Example 
 
In the space shuttle program, two valuable databases exist which exemplify the need to 
combine databases in some cases. One is the aforementioned PRACA IFA database. 
Another example of such a source are the In-Flight Anomalies (IFAs) recorded by the 
Mission Evaluation Room (MER). The MER is a safety and mission assurance board which 
provides real-time support for missions. If any anomalous condition or non-conformance is 
reported on the space shuttle, an operator on one of the MER consoles records the issue, 
generating a report for immediate investigation by the board regarding its potential safety 
and risk implications to the specific mission taking place. 
 
 
PRACA IFA Database Combined Database MER IFA Database
Problem Title Anomaly Title Anomaly Title
Detection Date Date/Time Date/Time
IFA Number MER Anomaly # Anomaly #
CAR Number PRACA IFA # Flight
System Number CAR # Anomaly Status
Problem Text Flight System 
Anomaly Status Description
System 
Description
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3.1.4 Anomaly Screening Methods 
 
The objective of an anomaly screening step is to filter out anomalies that obviously have 
little or no potential for safety impact. As discussed previously, anomaly reporting at 
NASA is carried out to serve diverse purposes, and as a result, a number of anomaly 
reports have little or no safety nexus. In addition, reporting is often implemented 
conservatively; in order to assure that no situation is disregarded that could potentially 
fall under the definition of an anomaly or nonconformance in accordance with NASA 
best practices [14], mission evaluation and problem reporting personnel typically take a 
conservative approach to reporting events that they consider out of the ordinary. Often, 
these are not actual anomalous events, but merely perceived non-conformances or 
misunderstood events. For example, a hardware item may require on-orbit calibration to 
function properly in a zero gravity environment.  In a case like this an anomaly report is 
opened to document the erroneous function prior to calibration, yet it does not represent a 
true hardware anomaly with an active failure mechanism.  Because of reports like this, 
problem reporting systems may contain a plethora of items, only a fraction of which will 
warrant a more detailed assessment for safety purposes. This conservative nature of 
anomaly reporting may allow for an initial screening for incidents that are relevant for 
APA. The screening process can be implemented by filtering the collection of anomalies 
based on a predefined set of screening rules. The screen should be quick and relatively 
effective at trimming off events whose causal mechanisms have no possible impact on 
safety or system reliability. It should not, however, inadvertently remove a potential 
precursor event from further consideration. Therefore, false positives (over-conservative 
assessments) are to be tolerated and expected in this preliminary screening of reported 
anomalies, while false negatives (non-conservative assessments) are to be minimized. 
 
The rules by which one screens anomalies are by no means standardized or are expected 
to be the same across different programs. Ideally, the application of the APA process to a 
new program will start without a screen, and gradually develop the rules for one as early 
applications of the process are conducted.  The rules for screening are very dependant on 
context, and some programs may have no screening procedures at all, while others may 
have many.   
 
 
 
Additionally, in some cases systems or types of hardware as a whole may not be capable 
of either creating a severe consequence or possessing an anomaly failure mechanism 
which could manifest itself in other systems. For example, soft goods or crew personal 
effects may be phenomenologically benign or functionally not necessary for a successful 
Space Shuttle Example 
 
In the Space Shuttle MER IFA database, the anomaly numbering scheme has one prefix for 
some anomalies, and a different prefix for others. Investigation into this phenomenon with 
MER personnel revealed that all records, when they are recorded, are given one prefix. 
Later, when they are further investigated and deemed to be an actual anomalous event, the 
prefix is changed to a different one. Therefore, a screen that filtered for the prefix which 
denotes an anomaly was established thereby “screening-in” only true non-conformance 
events.  
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flight.  This situation, if it occurs, will likely apply to either very unique or very isolated 
systems, for which postulating failures from the same mechanism, but outside of system 
borders, is not reasonable. If such cases exist, and the system as a whole can be deemed 
as non-critical to reliability or safety, then they may be screened out. 
 
When creating an anomaly screen, one should be careful to make a distinction between 
“non-anomalies,” and “non-critical anomalies.” Some event reports may document an 
anomaly; however, they may note that the anomaly was not critical to system reliability 
or safety. APA is focused upon identifying the causal failure mechanisms which initiate 
anomalies, and postulates other locations or times in which the same mechanism could 
have more severe results. As such, an anomaly report which identifies any failure 
mechanism, no matter how benign in the observed anomaly, is of potential value to the 
process as an indicator of an underlying failure mechanism that could have more severe 
consequences at other locations in the system or at other times in the mission. Any screen 
therefore should not “screen-out” anomalies simply based on the recorded criticality for 
that specific anomaly. 
 
3.2 Anomaly Failure Mechanism Identification & Generalization 
 
In order to assess the risk significance of the anomalous events in the anomaly caseload, 
it is first necessary to differentiate between that part of each anomaly that is characteristic 
of the system design and/or operation (and thus potentially recurring), versus that part 
that is circumstantial to the specific anomaly instance that actually occurred. This enables 
the APA process to evaluate the ways in which the characteristic aspect of the anomaly 
might recur, under less favorable circumstances that could lead to adverse consequences. 
The process step for doing this is called generalization
2
. 
 
Generalization instills within the APA process the ability to go beyond the circumstantial 
aspects of the anomaly as it occurred, to the spectrum of possible instantiations of the 
causal failure mechanism, i.e., what might occur. The scope of generalization goes 
beyond the immediate issue of assessing and mitigating the anomaly itself. Instead, it is 
focused on the anomaly‟s causal failure mechanism as it might arise in other 
circumstances, in order to identify design or operational vulnerabilities to the mechanism 
in a broader sense. Generalization produces a set of anomalous conditions which 
characterize the potential for the underlying mechanism to occur in the system as a 
whole. Anomaly generalization is illustrated in Figure 3-1, with the expanding cone 
representing the increasing number of postulated anomalous conditions originating from 
the initial anomaly review. 
 
                                                 
 
2
 The label “extrapolation” has also been suggested to emphasize the point that during this step observed 
phenomena are considered in different contexts. 
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Figure 3-1 Anomaly Generalization Illustration 
 
3.2.1 Identifying the Anomaly Failure Mechanism 
 
Ideally, the timing of the APA process relative to other anomaly investigation activities 
will be such that a causal analysis has been performed and is available as the basis of 
generalization. When this is the case, the causal analysis is reviewed to determine the 
appropriate point in the causal chain at which to define the failure mechanism. This point 
is not necessarily at the level of the “root cause,” defined by NASA as an organizational 
factor that contributes to or creates a subsequent undesired outcome [15]. Generalizing 
from organizational or root causes (e.g., failure to understand the importance of training) 
would tend to result in an unmanageable number of anomalous conditions, most of which 
would bear little, if any, phenomenological resemblance to the observed anomaly. 
Conversely, proximate causes (e.g., pipe leak) tend to be the result of prior physical 
conditions (e.g. improper installation, fitting wear-out, or contamination of fitting). 
Generalizing from proximate causes therefore tends not to inform the development of 
implementable recommendations to reduce system vulnerability. Instead, as a rule of 
thumb, the causal failure mechanism used for generalization should be the first physical 
contributor to the off-nominal condition of the system. In the above example of a pipe 
leak as a proximate cause, the intermediate causes of improper installation, fitting wear-
out, or contamination of fitting would each be a reasonable anomaly failure mechanism 
from which to generalize, since they represent the initial (or at least early) physical 
consequences of anomalous events (e.g. other examples include installation error, debris 
impact, electrical short and inadequate maintenance).  In this way the identification of the 
anomaly failure mechanism is somewhat subjective.  For any given anomaly there may 
be several ways to define the anomaly failure mechanism; this is acceptable within the 
APA process.  Also note that this example shows that both phenomenological (wear-out, 
contamination) and procedural
3
 (improper installation) failure mechanisms are 
                                                 
 
3
 Procedural errors can include those made during system operation as well as processing errors made 
during hardware assembly prior to operation 
Generalization
Other Times/Activities/Operational Phases
Other Locations in the system
Larger Fault Magnitude
Anomaly Causal Mechanism
Other Consequences
Anomalous 
Conditions
As  a common cause to multiple events
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appropriate for use with the APA process.  The process itself focuses on risks to safe 
operation during flight, but the origins of those risks can occur prior to flight (assembly, 
ground processing, etc.). 
 
 
 
In the case where a causal analysis has not been conducted, a decision must be made 
whether there is sufficient information, such as from the analysis of similar anomalies, to 
reasonably determine the anomaly‟s causal mechanism. If the possible causes of an 
anomaly can be reasonably narrowed down to a candidate failure mechanism this can be 
used as the basis for generalization, despite the possibility of investigating a mechanism 
that was not actually operative for the anomaly. Otherwise, if no reasonable failure 
mechanism can be established, this fact is noted and generalization of the anomaly is 
postponed pending the identification of a causal mechanism. 
 
3.2.2 The Scope of Generalization 
 
The intent behind Generalization is to identify design and operational vulnerabilities due 
to the failure mechanism. To limit the process of Generalization, it is restricted as a rule 
to the type of component(s) that are at risk to this mechanism. Generalizing the failure 
mechanism to other locations within the system is constrained to a generic component 
type that experienced the observed anomaly. Thus, for example, if the anomaly was a 
slow opening regulator valve, the generic component type might be regulator valves; the 
scope of generalization would then be limited to other regulator valves in the system, as 
opposed to being generalized to all valves. If the anomaly involves a leak resulting from a 
particular failure mechanism, then the population of similar components that are 
susceptible to that mechanism will be examined. If the anomaly involves cracks, then the 
susceptible population is the similar components that are made of similar material and 
subjected to similar stressors. The intent is to systematically expand the evaluation of the 
original anomaly to consider components of the same design or function that may also be 
susceptible to the same failure mechanism indicated by the anomaly event. 
 
In some cases the anomaly failure mechanism or other characteristics of the anomaly may 
make the scope of generalization very large or very small.  For example, consider an 
anomaly which was caused by crew procedural error.  Procedures may be written 
correctly, and the crew may be adequately trained for the procedure but the human-
element always allows for human error.  In this case, generalizing to other areas in which 
human error could create a problem would be seemingly endless, and thus the scope of 
generalization can be deemed too broad.  On the contrary to this, some anomalies may be 
the result of a failure mechanism so specific that it cannot be generalized to other 
components.  An example of this may be a software error that is attributed to one unique 
Failure Mechanism (Accident Precursor Analysis Operational Definition) 
For the purpose of APA, the anomaly failure mechanism is the initial off-nominal physical 
condition in the system and the jumping-off point for anomaly generalization. Examples of 
possible anomaly failure mechanisms include improper installation, fitting wear-out, and 
contamination.  
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string of code, such that the error couldn‟t possibly occur in other pieces of software.  In 
both of these cases generalization is not practical, and the generalization of the anomaly 
can stop. 
 
3.2.3 The Generalization Group 
 
During the APA generalization activity the team works through a series of anomaly 
reports (the anomaly caseload) one-by one, creating suitable anomalous conditions. In 
practice the team often encounters an anomaly that is actually a duplicate or recurrence of 
an anomaly previously generalized. To streamline the process, the duplicate or recurrent 
anomaly is assigned to the same generalization group as the original anomaly. The APA 
tool, DAnGERS, has been designed to assist in this step by searching for and identifying 
items which may belong to common generalization groups.  
 
Generalization groups are a useful way of grouping together similar anomalies (and 
consequently, also the resulting anomalous conditions). A generalization group gathers 
together observed anomalies and the postulated anomalous conditions composing of the 
same failure mechanism acting upon the same component type, i.e. everything within the 
same scope of generalization. 
 
Organizing anomalies into generalization groups provides two advantages;  
 
 It prevents the generalization team from generalizing the same type of anomaly 
twice. NASA anomaly reporting databases typically contain anomalous events of 
similar characteristics; a number of anomalies in an APA caseload often consist of 
the same failure mechanism acting upon the same generic component type. Even 
with two different anomalies one can create a matching group of anomalous 
conditions, if they consist of the same failure mechanisms acting upon the same 
generic component type. There is a many-to-many relationship between 
anomalies and anomalous conditions within a generalization group (see Figure 
3-2), as opposed to the one-to-many relationship that would be expected from an 
isolated anomaly. Ideally, the first anomaly of a generalization group will be used, 
via generalization, to scope out the set of anomalous conditions that span the 
generalization group. Thus, when subsequent anomalies in the generalization 
group occur, they are not expected to produce additional anomalous conditions 
unless some were unidentified previously. This practice of organizing anomalies 
into generalization groups saves time and effort during generalization sessions 
since it prevents the team from repeating deliberations and creating duplicate 
copies of anomalous conditions previously generalized. 
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Figure 3-2 Many-to-many Relationship between Anomalies and Anomalous Conditions 
 
 It provides a platform for grouping together related anomalies, for the purposes of 
future trending analysis. Within the context of APA, recurring anomalies consist 
of the same failure mechanism acting upon the same component type; therefore 
all the observed anomalies within a generalization group can be considered to be a 
series of recurring anomalies. This concept is presented in Figure 3-3; where a 
succession of anomalies occur along a timeline, each one consisting of a certain 
failure mechanism (denoted A,B,C) and a generic component type (X,Y,Z). The 
anomalies are organized into generalization groups according to their failure 
mechanism and generic component type; those composed of matching component 
type and failure mechanisms are classified as recurring anomalies and segregated 
into their respective groups.  
 
 
Figure 3-3 Recurring Anomalies in Generalization Groups 
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Parsing anomalies into generalization groups enables the APA process to actively group 
together related anomalies during generalization, thus creating suitable populations for 
the purposes of potential Observation & Trending (See Section 3.5 for further details). 
 
 
 
See Appendix C for DAnGERS illustrations on creating and managing generalization 
groups. 
 
3.2.4 Anatomy of the Anomalous Condition Accident Sequence 
 
As noted, at the onset of APA is the identification of a failure mechanism from which a 
set of generalized Anomalous Conditions are formulated.  Each of these anomalous 
conditions is used to define an accident sequence scenario by which the failure 
mechanism could ultimately progress to a severe consequence.  The structure of the 
accident sequence is defined by three points as shown in Figure 3-4 and will become the 
backbone for the structured APA review of anomalous conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 Structure of an Anomalous Condition Accident Sequence 
 
The accident sequence for each anomalous condition is defined as the Anomaly Failure 
Mechanism progressing to an intermediate failure state called the Failure Condition of 
Concern, and then that failure state ultimately progressing to the severe consequence.  
The accident‟s progression between each of these states may involve many different 
events along the accident sequence, all of which will help to characterize the specific 
 
Anomaly Failure 
Mechanism
Severe 
Consequence
Accident Sequence Events Accident Sequence Events
Failure 
Condition of 
Concern
May lead to May lead to
ISS Example 
 
An anomaly involving an electrical fault within a Sequential Shunt Unit (SSU) was caused by 
high-energy radiation particles in August 2009. In this case the failure mechanism was 
classified as a single-event upset and the generic component type was External Local Data 
Interfaces (LDIs). Almost a year later the same subsystem experienced an anomaly within a 
Battery Charge/Discharge Unit (BCDU) involving an electrical fault. After investigation it was 
discovered that the anomalous event was caused by high-energy radiation particles. The 
failure mechanism within this second anomaly was identified as a single-event upset and the 
generic component type was External Local Data Interfaces (LDIs). Although these two 
separate anomalies occurred within different locations and at different times, they are 
intrinsically related and tell us something valuable about the occurrence of high-energy 
radiation in external LDI components. If a trending activity were to be recommended for 
either of these anomalies, both events should be included as data points within the same 
trend.  
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accident sequence under consideration. Each of these terms is defined further in Section 
3.2.5. 
 
3.2.5 Generalizing the Anomaly Failure Mechanism 
 
Once the anomaly failure mechanism is identified, it is generalized throughout the 
system. The deliberative process considers the potential recurrence of the anomaly causal 
mechanism with varying characteristics in the following fields: 
 
 Fault Magnitude – Anomalous events typically manifest in a range of fault 
magnitudes, with the majority of events lying at the smaller end of the magnitude 
spectrum (many do not even result in a fault). Generalization also considers the 
potential for the failure mechanism to produce a higher fault magnitude than was 
previously experienced by the anomaly. The presence of a larger fault magnitude 
in the system can present a higher potential for severe consequences; e.g. a crack 
in a fluid line may result in a release of fluid at some leak rate. A high leak rate 
caused by a large crack may result in a sufficient volume of fluid that presents a 
toxic/fire hazard. 
 
 Susceptible Locations – Each component of the identified type is evaluated to 
identify locations that are susceptible to the failure mechanism, which could 
potentially lead to failure, and that may have the potential to lead to severe 
consequences. If a component is on a system whose failure clearly has no safety 
implications, and which is sufficiently isolated from other systems that failures 
are locally contained, then the component would not be considered susceptible, 
since there is no potential for severe consequences. This is the case even if the 
component is physically susceptible to the failure mechanism. Only when a 
component is physically susceptible to the failure mechanism and there may be a 
potential for severe consequences is the location considered susceptible from the 
perspective of APA.  
 
The goal at this point is to determine the scope of susceptible locations that could 
be forwarded to the grading exercise, making efforts to identify all locations 
where the anomaly failure mechanism has the potential to lead to severe 
consequences, while also minimizing the number of ultimately insignificant 
anomalous conditions. 
 
 Exposure Time/Activity – NASA systems are typically dynamic, changing 
through numerous flight segments, environments, configurations, and operational 
states or phases. Failure mechanisms that occur benignly at one point in time 
might be catastrophic in another, even for the same location (i.e. an external 
ammonia fluid line leak during normal operations might not result in any severe 
consequences; however if the same leak were to occur during Extravehicular 
Activity [EVA] maintenance, ammonia fluid could collect on an Extravehicular 
Mobility Unit [EMU] resulting in potential atmospheric poisoning upon EVA 
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ingress). Therefore, to provide an operational context for subsequent assessment, 
each anomalous condition is qualitatively evaluated to identify the time period or 
activity during which the failure mechanism could have critical results. This 
entails a degree of system-level evaluation of the possible effects of the failure 
condition of concern, but the intent is not to conduct a detailed investigation into 
its possible propagation pathways. If qualitative evaluation suggests that the 
system may be vulnerable to the failure condition of concern during multiple 
periods (e.g., during distinct mission activities), then each should be separately 
captured. 
 
 Failure Condition of Concern - For components that are susceptible to the 
failure mechanism, the Generalization Team (see section 3.2.6 for details) 
identifies the failure condition of concern, i.e. the failure state that could be 
caused by the failure mechanism, and which has the potential to propagate to 
severe consequences. The failure condition of concern will typically correspond 
to a genuine failure of a particular item or function, as opposed to a merely out of 
spec condition. It may vary from location to location, even for the same failure 
mechanism, due to the different functions and system interactions associated with 
different components. For phenomenological failures, the failure condition of 
concern will typically represent a hazardous environment of a sufficient 
magnitude to represent a threat to the neighboring equipment. Thus, for example, 
if the failure of the susceptible component is a hydrazine leak, then the failure 
condition of concern would indicate, at least qualitatively, the size of leak 
necessary for producing a local hazard.  
 
The failure condition of concern is a key element of the accident precursor 
analysis process. It structures the assessment of susceptibility by providing an 
anchor point for consideration of propagation pathways from failure mechanism 
to severe consequences. Given a failure condition of concern, the assessment can 
be partitioned into a portion from failure mechanism to failure condition of 
concern, and a portion from failure condition of concern to severe consequences 
(see Figure 3-4). Moreover, the failure condition of concern, and the partition it 
represents between the failure mechanism and the severe consequences, is 
fundamental to subsequent APA process steps. Identifying the failure condition of 
concern at this point in the process facilitates the data collection activity 
(discussed in the next section) that supports these subsequent steps. The failure 
condition of concern should be described to a level of detail that will allow a data 
miner to find all pieces of information that could be of potential benefit for 
assessing the actual potential for the failure mechanism to lead to the failure 
condition of concern, as well as gathering information related to the potential for 
that failure condition of concern to propagate to severe consequences. 
 
 Severe Consequence – The „brainstorming‟ activity of generalization occurs 
within the context of the severe consequence(s) defined by the program. A severe 
consequence serves as the terminal event in the accident sequence characterized 
by the anomalous condition (see Figure 3.4). Severe Consequence(s) are typically 
 31 
 
defined by the program‟s risk management practices e.g. Loss of Science, Loss of 
Mission, Loss of Crew, the terminal events of the generalized anomalous 
conditions within APA must correlate with these. Once the location, exposure 
time/activity, and failure condition of concern have been determined, the severe 
consequence that could potentially be realized is identified. For programs with a 
single severe consequence of interest there is no decision to be made and only 
those accident sequences that can credibly produce the single severe consequence 
are considered. For those programs which have multiple severe consequences 
defined, the scope of generalization is broadened to include anomalous conditions 
that may propagate to a variety of terminal events. In some cases, an anomalous 
condition may exhibit the potential to result in more than one severe consequence 
under different circumstances (example: an electrical short on a circuit board 
within a science rack may lead to loss of science; however the same electrical 
short on a circuit board whilst in the presence of a hydrazine leak may result in 
fire ignition and loss of crew). The APA process allows anomalous conditions to 
be generated for multiple severe consequences. 
 
Engineering judgment, conservatively applied, is sufficient to identify a set of anomalous 
conditions. It is not meant to include every possible instantiation of the failure 
mechanism within the susceptible component type, but covers the anomalous conditions 
that are susceptible to the failure mechanism and could credibly result in severe 
consequences. The natural tension between the need to minimize false positives as well 
as false negatives must be resolved in favor of minimizing false negatives. 
 
The result of generalization is a well-scoped set of anomalous conditions that envelope 
the potential for risk-significant occurrences of the observed anomaly failure mechanism 
throughout the system and at different times (for the affected component type).  
 
Generalization is important even for (perhaps especially for) anomalies with little or no 
direct safety impact. A failure that is benign when it occurs under one set of 
circumstances may not be benign under another set. Figure 3-5 illustrates this by showing 
a relatively benign anomaly (low potential for severe consequences) whose causal 
mechanism might well have led to severe consequences (high potential for severe 
consequences) were it to have occurred differently. Thus, each anomalous condition can 
be independently assessed in subsequent APA process steps, without particular regard for 
the specific anomaly that prompted the analysis to begin with. 
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Figure 3-5 Anomalous-Condition-Dependent Consequence Potential 
 
Although all anomalous conditions can be forwarded for further evaluation and grading, 
the fact is that time and resources can be better spent on focusing on those that have the 
highest potential of having severe consequences. Therefore it is recommended that once a 
sufficiently comprehensive set of anomalous conditions has been defined, the team 
reviews it for those bounding anomalous conditions it recommends be further evaluated. 
Since the point is ultimately to identify the risk significance of the failure mechanism, the 
crux of this exercise is to select the anomalous conditions that the team believes show the 
greatest potential for propagating to a severe consequence at this early phase in the 
process (see APPENDIX C for a DAnGERS screenshot which shows such a selection). 
Keep in mind that this process should not be bogged down by the exactness of the 
selections, so if there is any doubt which anomalous conditions could be more dire, then 
all those for which no distinction can be made in regards to potential severity should be 
retained. 
 
3.2.6 The Generalization Team 
 
As indicated in Table 2.1, Generalization is a team activity involving, at a minimum, 
precursor analysis experts to act as facilitator and scribe, and systems engineers with a 
comprehensive knowledge of system function, operation and system integration. 
 
The activity is led by a facilitator, who challenges the team to consider the different 
circumstances in which the failure mechanism might occur. The facilitator balances 
comprehensiveness with time efficiency, making sure that the group considers a 
sufficient variety of circumstances, while also preventing the group from getting bogged 
down by over-generalizing the failure mechanism outside the bounds specified in Section 
3.2.2. The skill and dogged focus of the precursor analysis expert in the role of facilitator 
is critical to successfully conducting generalization. The facilitator should be well versed 
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in the nuances of the accident precursor analysis technical approach and somewhat 
familiar with the system to help draw out relevant insights from the subsystem experts. 
The facilitator should also play devil‟s advocate and encourage dissenting opinions to 
avoid a “group” think environment. 
 
The role of scribe also plays a crucial support role in properly capturing the group‟s 
rationale at various points in the process in enough detail to make it comprehensible to 
someone reading the various justifications and descriptions in the future, but concise 
enough so that the process is not bogged down by endless documentation. The scribe 
should be familiar with the tool (e.g., DAnGERS) used to record the session and be able 
to navigate it as needed to support deliberations. 
 
In application, the number of participants in a generalization session will vary. In general, 
proceedings will move along smoothly with a minimum of a facilitator with APA 
expertise, a system expert, a safety engineer and a scribe. Fewer than this minimum does 
not properly provide the quorum needed to effectively drive the process, and more (e.g., 
three system experts) can lead to extended deliberations, although the extended 
discussions could, if properly structured, lead to a better understanding of the potential 
effect of the failure mechanism. When generalizing anomalies from complex systems, it 
is often found that having multiple systems engineers present (each being expert in 
different subsystems) is beneficial to generalizing the causal mechanism across various 
subsystems. 
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3.3 Evidence Gathering 
 
The output of generalization is a set of anomalous conditions deemed worthy of further 
evaluation and grading. Subsequent grading of these anomalous conditions involves an 
Space Shuttle Example of Generalization 
 
The Space Shuttle anomaly database contains an anomaly involving a sluggish helium 
reaction control system (RCS) fuel regulator. During generalization, the anomaly failure 
mechanism was identified as contamination, and generalized to the following anomalous 
conditions: 
 
o RCS helium regulator fails closed due to contamination; 
 
o Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) helium regulator failure to open due to 
contamination; 
 
o OMS helium regulator failure to close due to contamination. 
 
The figure below illustrates the characteristics of the anomaly generalization process with a 
sample set of anomalous conditions. Each of these conditions was qualitatively evaluated to 
determine the point in the mission profile where its occurrence had the greatest potential to 
produce critical results. Subsequent analysis determined that the anomalous conditions 
generalized to the OMS were more risk significant than those that were applied to the RCS. 
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evaluation of their potential to produce severe consequences. This potential depends on 
the physical locations and functional roles of the affected components.  
 
Prior to grading an anomalous condition, data on each of the affected subsystems is 
collected, as well as sufficient system-level data to evaluate the potential for each failure 
condition of concern to occur, given the presence of the failure mechanism, and the 
potential for the failure condition of concern to propagate to severe consequences.  The 
purpose of gathering evidence at this step is to root the decisions made during grading in 
some form of concrete and traceable data.  Ideally this data will be in the form of 
engineering drawings, test results, physical analyses, etc, and will provide a more 
definitive basis than a speculative one by which to make judgments. 
 
The task of evidence gathering serves as a break between the processes of Generalization 
and Grading (see Figure 2-5). It is an activity that can be conducted on an individual 
level, or split up and assigned to individuals of an evidence gathering team. As illustrated 
in Table 2.1, in order for the evidence gathered to provide useful information to the 
grading process the personnel must require competency in data mining and data 
interpretation and at-least moderate technical knowledge in the relevant engineering field 
or subsystem. In application to STS and ISS programs, it has been found that the most 
useful information is gathered by personnel who are knowledgeable in both system 
documentation and system-level effects of failure.  
 
Since there is no distinction between anomalies and postulated anomalous conditions at 
this stage, the individuals or teams gathering the data treat each record equally. This is 
important since the data collectors may be swayed by the rigor they put into searching for 
relevant information based on whether they perceive the anomalous condition to be a 
“real anomaly”. The data collected in this step is in addition to the anomaly-related data 
that has already been collected and used for purposes such as identifying the anomaly 
failure mechanism.  
 
Because of the important role that evidence plays within the APA process, the data that is 
collected must be judged by the grading team as relevant to the analysis of the failure 
mechanism under consideration. It is not enough to associate data with a failure condition 
of concern if it does not bear in some direct way on the likelihood of the failure due to the 
mechanism, the propagation of that failure through the system, or the realization of 
severe consequences. Table 3.1 lists some of the data types that may be useful for 
understanding the potential system-level effects of failure, as well as the minimum 
criteria for inclusion in the collection. 
 
The tool for conducting APA, DAnGERS, provides reporting features such as an 
„Evidence Gathering Report‟ to support data mining activities. This report lists all 
anomalous conditions recommended for grading that are awaiting evidence; each 
anomalous condition is presented clearly and characterized by its relevant properties (i.e. 
failure mechanism, susceptible component, time frame, failure condition of concern and 
severe consequence). It is provided to data mining personnel to help guide the process of 
evidence collection, to provide an accident sequence structure on which to build evidence 
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around, and to organize the collected documentation into legible „evidence cases‟ for 
each anomalous condition. For further details on the evidence gathering report and other 
DAnGERS reports, see Appendix D. 
 
The data collected should be organized in a manner such that it can be easily accessed 
during the grading session in which it is used.  The set of evidentiary data may be 
delivered to the grading team in hard copy or digital format, as is available for each piece 
of evidence.  To facilitate its ease of use, the evidence should be cataloged with respect to 
the relevant anomalous conditions, and listing the evidence title, document number, and 
the type of evidence.  If the specific piece of data is available in an online database, a link 
may also be provided.  Figure 3-6 shows an example representation of the organized 
output of the Evidence Gathering step. 
 
Table 3.1 Common Data Types and Minimum Criteria for Inclusion of Data 
Data Type Minimum Criteria for Inclusion 
Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) 
Addresses failure mode involved in the accident progression 
System Schematic Shows components and interrelations involved in the accident progression 
Design Drawing Shows components and interrelations involved in the accident progression. 
Shows physical properties assumed in phenomenological judgments. 
Fault Tree Model Basic events include failure of interest and credited control failures under 
same or substantially similar system configuration and phenomenological 
conditions. 
Operating 
Procedures 
Events trigger procedures via established protocols. Procedural actions impact 
accident progression. 
Reliability Analysis Addresses same or substantially similar system under same or substantially 
similar conditions. 
Test Procedure Test protocols either establish failure thresholds or span credible conditions. 
Physics Model Addresses same or substantially similar system under same or substantially 
similar conditions. 
Post-Flight 
Inspection Report 
Addresses failure mechanism or failure mode involved in the accident 
progression. 
Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) 
Events include failure of interest and credited control failures under same or 
substantially similar system configuration and phenomenological conditions. 
Root Cause Analysis Addresses failure mode involved in the accident progression. 
Failure Observed in 
Operation 
Addresses failure mode involved in the accident progression. 
Test Data Data either establishes failure thresholds or span credible conditions. 
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Figure 3-6 Example Summary of Evidence Gathered 
 
3.4 Grading of Anomalous Conditions 
 
The handoff from the initial generalization session and the subsequent evidence gathering 
activity is a set of anomalous conditions which have been produced from identified 
anomaly failure mechanisms and recommended for grading by the generalization team. 
Once sufficient evidence has been gathered, a multidisciplinary team will evaluate each 
anomalous condition for its risk implications based on the collection of applicable data. 
The following section describes in detail the methodology behind this process, known as 
Grading. 
 
 
 
For each anomalous condition that is evaluated in the grading process, a risk metric 
referred to as the Potential Problem Index (PPI) is assigned via a deliberative evaluation 
process, as discussed below. The PPI is formulated so that anomalous conditions with a 
Grading 
 
Grading is the portion of the APA process that evaluates anomalous conditions and 
recommends them for either risk modeling, observation and trending, or no further action, 
based on their assessed potential to lead to severe consequences. The process involves 
team evaluation of that potential in an anomalous condition in the context of its potential to 
produce an identified failure condition of concern and subsequent severe consequences. 
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high PPI warrant further investigation of the causal failure mechanism and its effect on 
system risk; those with a moderate PPI warrant a recommendation for continued 
monitoring and trending of related anomalies that share the underlying failure 
mechanism; and those with a low PPI are graded out of the process as being of low 
significance to the risk metrics being addressed. 
 
Once an anomaly‟s failure mechanism has been generalized into a set of anomalous 
conditions, and the requisite evidence has been collected, the grading process can be 
conducted. Each anomalous condition is analyzed through the process of grading on an 
individual basis; the evidence that is applicable to the anomalous condition is considered 
and informs the assignment of a Failure Condition Index (FCI) and Conditional 
Consequence Index (CCI). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7 FCI and CCI in the accident sequence 
 
It is important to keep a scenario-based perspective in mind when assigning FCI and CCI 
values to make sure that they are consistent with the definition of the failure condition of 
concern, i.e., the failure condition of concern upon which the CCI is conditioned should 
be the same as that used to assign the FCI. The assignment of FCI and CCI values is 
discussed in subsequent subsections. The FCI and the CCI are combined, along with the 
evidence caliber discussed in Section 3.4.3, to generate the PPI. 
 
Anomaly Failure 
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Severe 
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Failure Condition Index (FCI) 
 
A qualitative measure of the likelihood for the specified failure condition of concern, given an 
occurrence of the anomaly failure mechanism on the specified component and at the specified 
time. 
 
Conditional Consequence Index (CCI) 
 
A qualitative measure of the likelihood for severe consequences, given an occurrence of the 
specified failure condition of concern. 
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3.4.1 Assigning the Failure Condition Index 
 
The FCI is assessed as the likelihood that an anomalous instance of the anomaly failure 
mechanism will propagate to the point where the threshold for the failure condition of 
concern is exceeded. This includes consideration of stressors that could exacerbate the 
failure mechanism and its propagation. It is important to remember that the context of the 
assessment is the postulated occurrence of the anomaly failure mechanism in a more 
severe manner and not the actual anomaly that was initially observed. Assessing the FCI 
of an anomalous condition involves three considerations: 
 
1. The possible magnitudes of the anomaly failure mechanism 
 
2. The threshold for the failure condition of concern 
 
3. The ways in which the anomaly failure mechanism can propagate to produce 
conditions that exceed the threshold for the failure condition of concern 
 
Potential Problem Index (PPI) 
 
The PPI is the metric used in the APA process to grade an anomalous condition for either risk 
modeling, observation and trending, or no further analysis. The PPI is built up from three 
underlying metrics: the Failure Condition Index (FCI), the Conditional Consequence Index 
(CCI), and the Evidence Caliber (EC). The PPI takes into account: 
 
 The potential for the anomalous condition to propagate from the anomaly failure 
mechanism to the failure condition of concern 
 The potential for the failure condition of concern to propagate to severe 
consequences 
 The caliber of the evidence used to support the above two potentials 
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With regard to the threshold for the failure condition of concern, the range of conditions 
that the failure mechanism can propagate to needs to be assessed relative to the failure 
threshold.  
 
The FCI assessment is conditional on the existence of the anomaly failure mechanism in 
the specified component.  That is to say, the FCI does not take into account the likelihood 
for the failure mechanism to occur, only the likelihood that it can progress to the failure 
condition of concern.  This conditional approach is prescribed for a number of reasons.   
First and foremost, it is conservative.  At this stage in the process the concern is making 
coarse assessments of anomalous conditions to justify which need further detailed 
analysis and which do not.  False positives are preferable to false negatives and possibly 
overlooking an underappreciated risk.  Another reason for the conditional approach is 
economy.  The grading part of the APA process is intended to be a quick triage 
assessment for identifying areas for further analysis.  By taking a conditional approach, 
the assessment can be performed without considering the likelihood of the failure 
mechanism existing, and thus can be performed more quickly and easily.   
 
The FCI is intended to be assignable on the basis of qualitative information, without 
explicit calculation. The FCI is assigned based on a qualitative descriptor, from a given 
set of terms, which best indicates the potential for the failure mechanism to produce the 
failure condition of concern. Each term indicates a particular susceptibility for failure, 
accounting for the severity spectrum of the mechanism and its effect at impacted 
locations. The FCI should be informed by existing data and supporting evidence. This 
might include fault size data for past occurrences, assessments of the bounding fault 
magnitude, damage thresholds for safety systems, or critical fault sizes above which a 
failure condition exists. Whatever material is used for evidence it must be recorded, not 
only for basic configuration management but also because the caliber of the evidence 
plays a role in the ultimate grading that the anomalous condition receives. Each 
qualitative descriptor is associated with a numeric FCI value. Table 3.2 presents the FCI 
assignment table used in ISS application of APA, which (along with the corresponding 
CCI table discussed in the next section) has been strongly influenced by the ISS Program 
Risk Scorecard [16], along with work in [8] and [9]. 
 
Table 3.2 FCI Assignment Table 
Failure Condition Index (FCI) 
Descriptor Index Description of Basis 
Very Likely 6 The failure condition of concern is expected to happen given the 
occurrence of the anomalous failure mechanism 
Likely 5 It is likely that the anomalous failure mechanism could cause the failure 
condition of concern  
Possible 4 It is possible that the anomalous failure mechanism could cause the failure 
condition of concern  
Unlikely 3 It is unlikely that the anomalous failure mechanism could cause the failure 
condition of concern  
Highly Unlikely 2 It is highly unlikely that the anomalous failure mechanism could cause the 
failure condition of concern  
Non-Credible 1 The failure condition of concern is not credible given the occurrence of the 
anomalous failure mechanism 
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The assigned qualitative FCI descriptor must ultimately be based on evidence, leading to 
the question of the caliber of the evidence used in the assignment. Where the evidence is 
weak, uncertainty is potentially large, and the “true” significance of the anomalous 
condition as a potential precursor might be higher than its assessed value would suggest. 
To accommodate this uncertainty, grading depends not only on the assigned FCI and CCI 
values, but also on the type of data used to support the evaluation, and its applicability to 
the anomalous condition under consideration (screenshots of the DAnGERS tool and how 
it records evidentiary data are available in Appendix C). 
 
As codified in the DAnGERS tool, each generic data type is given a pre-established 
Baseline Data Type Caliber as a measure of the maximum credit that can be taken for the 
data, based on how generically useful or relevant that data type is expected to be. This is 
relative to the need in APA to ground the conclusions of the grading team in objective 
evidence. For example, test data has the potential to be very relevant as evidence, as test 
data can correlate the severity of a failure mechanism to a variety of relevant parameters; 
conversely, existing reliability analyses may be less relevant as evidence, because they 
represent the current state of knowledge regarding the system, and may not capture 
unknown vulnerabilities to failure mechanisms or the conditions they may create. In 
general, appropriate values for the caliber for each specific type of data may vary from 
one program to another (as might the type of data itself), for heritage reasons or reasons 
of analysis methodologies. When establishing an APA process for use with a system, a 
list of available data types should be assembled, and baseline data type calibers should be 
assigned based on the judgment of the precursor facilitators and system or program 
experts. 
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During evaluation of FCI, the evaluation team identifies the data upon which they are 
basing their FCI assignment, and for each piece of data they assign an applicability 
rating, indicating the degree to which the data addresses the scenario(s) under 
consideration. Strong objective evidence (i.e., evidence with a high baseline data type 
caliber) might not directly address the accident conditions under evaluation (e.g., the 
regime of high fault magnitude where the potential to realize the failure condition or 
concern is greatest). Or, even when conditions match the postulated accident conditions, 
the uncertainty might be too high to confidently support a low FCI value, for example 
when test data in the appropriate regime is sparse. The applicability of the data is 
assessed qualitatively, with each rank corresponding to a percentage. Five ranks are used: 
strongly applicable, mostly applicable, somewhat applicable, slightly applicable, and 
minimally applicable. These applicability assignments, along with similar assignments 
for the data supporting CCI evaluation, are ultimately used in conjunction with the FCI 
and CCI values to determine the PPI and the corresponding grading of the anomalous 
condition. This process is described in more detail in Section 3.4.3. 
 
It is critically important that the evidence used to support FCI and CCI assessments be 
reviewed and understood.  Often, failures occur due to “unknown unknowns”.  That is, an 
attempt has been made to study the system and understand all of the operational 
uncertainties and vulnerabilities, but the understanding may be incomplete or incorrect.  
Because of this, it is the responsibility of the grading team to review the evidence used 
with a critical eye, questioning to make sure that the evidence presents a complete picture 
and that nothing was missed in the original analysis.  If there is doubt within the group 
International Space Station Example 
 
The FCI and CCI baseline data types and respective data type caliber values in the table 
below were developed for application to the ISS Program based on experience with that 
program‟s data types and underlying methodologies. These values were incorporated into the 
ISS DAnGERS tool to support FCI and CCI evaluation. 
 
Type of Data Baseline Data 
Type Caliber 
Test Data 90% 
Operational Observation 90% 
Root Cause Analysis 75% 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment 70% 
Physics Model 60% 
Test Procedures 50% 
Reliability Analysis 50% 
Operating Procedures 50% 
Fault Tree Model 40% 
Design Drawing 40% 
System Schematic 30% 
Engineering Judgment 25% 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 20% 
Educated Postulation 10% 
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that the complete picture is understood, that should weigh in to the grading assessment 
for both FCI and CCI, again remembering to be conservative (false positives are 
preferable to false negatives). 
 
3.4.2 Assigning the Conditional Consequence Index 
 
The Conditional Consequence Index indicates the potential that the failure condition of 
concern will result in severe consequences. This is a function of the degree to which 
safeguards or barriers are present to mitigate the consequences given the failure condition 
of concern. If no such safeguards or barriers are present then the CCI should indicate that 
the severe consequence is expected. If they are present, then assigning a CCI value 
involves assessing the potential for these safeguards and barriers failing. 
 
Safeguards and barriers that could mitigate the consequences can involve:  
 
 Additional safety systems (levels of redundancy) 
 
 Recovery actions 
 
 Physical separation from an accident source 
 
 Shields preventing penetration 
 
 Time constraints on the propagation process 
 
Assessment of the potential of particular safeguards and barriers failing is application 
dependent. Table 3.3 gives a list of qualitative descriptors used to designate the potential 
and associates each with a CCI value. Like the FCI, CCI assignment should be dependent 
on available data and analysis, which should be recorded as part of the assessment 
process. 
 
Table 3.3 CCI Assignment Table 
Conditional Consequence Index (CCI) 
Descriptor Index Description of Basis 
Very Likely 6 Give the failure condition of concern the severe consequences would be 
expected  
Likely 5 It is likely that severe consequences would result given the failure 
condition of concern  
Possible 4 It is possible that severe consequences would result given the failure 
condition of concern  
Unlikely 3 It is unlikely that severe consequences would result given the failure 
condition of concern  
Highly Unlikely 2 It is highly unlikely that severe consequences would result given the failure 
condition of concern  
Non-Credible 1 The failure condition of concern could not credibly give rise to severe 
consequence  
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Like FCI, the assigned qualitative CCI descriptor must ultimately be based on evidence. 
Hence, the same process for assessing data applicability is used for CCI evaluation that 
was used for FCI evaluation. The types of data that are generically relevant to CCI 
assignment are identical to those relevant to FCI assignment, as are their baseline data 
type calibers, as shown in the previous example. 
 
3.4.3 Grading Results 
 
In the grading step, a numerical risk score is computed based on consequence indices and 
data calibers and applicability levels determined in the previous steps, using a scoring 
rule that intends to capture the impact of the consequence indices and evidence caliber on 
the perception of risk. 
 
The risk score is primarily a function of the FCI and CCI scores. Under the assumption 
that the steps of the FCI and CCI represent order of magnitude changes in the respective 
potential levels, the FCI and CCI scores are summed to obtain an overall problem 
potential measure. 
 
Additionally the scoring rule applies an upward adjustment when there is limited 
evidence available, to reflect the level of uncertainty as part of the Problem Potential 
Index (PPI): if the data type caliber of all the data used to evaluate FCI and CCI were 
100%, and all the data were strongly applicable to their respective evaluations, then the 
PPI could be determined directly from FCI and CCI, and in fact would simply be the sum 
of FCI and CCI. For decreasing evidence calibers, progressively larger positive 
adjustments are made, resulting in correspondingly higher PPI values for the same FCI 
and CCI values. 
 
The evidence caliber itself is a function of the baseline data type calibers and assigned 
applicability of the supporting data used by the evaluation team when assigning FCI and 
CCI. For each piece of data, its applicability (expressed as a percentage) is multiplied by 
the baseline data type caliber to produce a Data Caliber, DC.  
 
ityapplicabil*caliber datatypeDC  
 
Then, the DC metrics are aggregated together to produce an overall Evidence Caliber, 
EC, which ranges between 0 (no evidence) and 1 (fully informative evidence). This is 
done in such a manner that incremental pieces of evidence will drive the EC towards 1. 
However, as EC gets closer to 1 (representing a fully informed state), additional 
information will have a diminished impact: 
 
)]1(*...*)1(*)1[(1 21 MFCI DCDCDCEC  
Equation 1 
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)]1(*...*)1(*)1[(1 21 NMMCCI DCDCDCEC  
Equation 2 
 
CCIFCIPPI ECECEC *  
Equation 3 
 
In the above equations, M pieces of data support FCI assignment (Equation 1) and N - M 
pieces support CCI assignment (Equation 2).  
This simplified evidence caliber rule simply treats each piece of evidence as additive, and 
does not account for conflicting information. 
 
Equation 1 through Equation 3 define the data caliber aggregation within a single index 
(ECFCI and ECCCI, respectively), and for the two indices combined (ECPPI). Aggregation 
within an index is treated as a co-product, under the principle that multiple sources of 
evidence contribute to an increasing confidence in the assigned value. Aggregation across 
the indices is treated as a product, under the principle that each index is separately 
supported by its evidence, so that the evidentiary support for PPI as a whole is no 
stronger than its weakest link. If ECPPI is low then one can conclude that there is some 
uncertainty in PPI, and therefore the grading should be correspondingly conservative in 
this case. The equation for PPI is given by the following: 
 
Equation 4 
 
where c is a constant that controls the impact of the data caliber on the risk score. During 
the precursor pilot exercises, a value of c = 1.1 was adopted, causing the difference 
between no evidence and fully informative evidence to be approximately one step on the 
potential scale. 
 
The PPI is the grading metric for each anomalous condition which is the basis for the 
recommended further action as shown in Figure 3-8.  A high PPI is used to denote an 
anomalous condition with a high level of perceived risk, and correspondingly a low PPI 
denotes a low level of perceived risk. The grading result specifies: 
 
 Risk modeling in the case of a high PPI; 
 
 Observation and trending, in the case of a moderate PPI; and 
 
 No further analysis, in the case of a low PPI. 
 
For high values of evidence caliber, PPI closely matches the sum of FCI and CCI. For 
low values of evidence caliber, PPI is higher than the sum of FCI and CCI, indicating an 
upward adjustment to account for the higher uncertainty inherent in the FCI and CCI 
assignments.  To account for the differences between specific programs there are no 
absolute thresholds set for the division between each further action.  For example, an 
anomalous condition which receives a PPI grade of 8.2 might be considered lower risk by 
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some programs, and yet high risk by others.  Instead the thresholds should be set on 
program-by-program basis, tailoring to the specific needs of the program.  One method 
for doing this is by applying APA to known issues as benchmarks, and using the expected 
outcome as a way by which to set threshold levels.   
 
 
Figure 3-8 Notional Graph of Recommended Further Action as a Function on FCI, CCI, and ECPPI 
 
The lowest possible graded result simply indicates that the anomalous condition is not 
risk significant. The anomalous condition was recommended for grading; however, upon 
evaluation, the assessed PPI indicates that the anomalous condition is within the safety 
envelope of the system and does not warrant further analysis. 
 
If the PPI of an anomalous condition is judged not to be high enough to warrant explicit 
risk modeling, but also is non-negligible, then an intermediate grading recommends 
observation and trending of the failure mechanism to ensure (1) that the full history of the 
failure mechanism is brought to bear on the characterization of the spectrum of fault 
magnitudes; (2) that parameters correlating to anomaly occurrence and fault magnitude 
are identified; and (3) that adverse trends in frequency or fault magnitude are identified 
before they penetrate the safety envelope of the system. Once the finding is made, if the 
recurring problem analysis determines that the anomaly is not part of a recurring set of 
events, it is possible that the failure mechanism is deemed to be a low risk, or in other 
words “not risk significant.” However, if there is anomaly trend that raises questions then 
additional modeling may be necessary to understand the trending pattern to ensure that 
the failure mechanism poses no significant risk to the system, or to redesign the system to 
preclude recurrence. 
 
 
 
PPI
ECPPI
Recommended 
Further Action
Risk Modeling
Observation &    
Trending
None
 47 
 
The highest grading possible, risk modeling, is prescribed for those circumstances where 
the potential for severe consequences is too high to simply continue observation and 
trending. The rationale is that a high PPI for a failure mechanism that has actually 
occurred warrants an explicit investigation into its risk implications. Risk modeling is 
discussed further in Section 3.6. 
 
3.4.4 The Grading Team 
 
As indicated, grading is a team activity involving, at a minimum, precursor analysis 
experts to act as facilitator and scribe, systems engineers with a comprehensive 
knowledge of system function, and safety personnel who understand the subsystem and 
system-level effects of failures. The environment is that of structured brainstorming, 
similar to that used to conduct FMEAs and Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOPs). 
 
The activity is led by a facilitator, who moderates the evaluation of each anomalous 
condition, making sure that all voices are heard, and who fosters consensus on FCI and 
CCI designation in terms of reasonable, conservative values given the spectrum of 
opinion and variety of data that are present. The facilitator assures that key assumptions 
and results upon which the team‟s reasoning depends are supported by documented 
evidence. As with generalization, the facilitator balances comprehensiveness with time 
efficiency, in this case making sure that the group evaluates each anomalous condition to 
an appropriate degree, while also preventing the group from getting bogged down or 
sidetracked, e.g., due to differences of opinion or speculation in the face of limited data. 
As the facilitator steps through each anomalous condition, systems experts and safety 
engineers evaluate the potential for progression from failure mechanism to failure 
condition of concern, and from failure condition of concern to severe consequences. 
 
3.5 Observation & Trending 
 
Anomalous conditions that are perceived to represent a moderate potential for producing 
severe consequences are recommended for continued Observation & Trending. 
Observation & Trending is the process of tracking and analyzing related anomalies over 
time, in order to identify trends in the recurrence of anomaly failure mechanisms, before 
they manifest themselves as more severe problems. Trending anomaly data can include: 
 
 Trends in the rate of anomaly recurrence (frequency) 
 
 Trends in fault magnitude as a result of anomaly failure mechanisms 
 
 Trends in the Potential Problem Index (PPI trending) 
 
Trending anomaly occurrences can help shed light on the time-dependent behavior of 
systems and thus refine the understanding of anomaly failure mechanisms at work. 
Trends in the data can be both „positive‟ and „negative‟; it can tell us that a causal 
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mechanism is recurring with an increasing frequency over time, which could imply that 
some corrective action for the component type experiencing the mechanism may be 
warranted. Conversely an anomaly that is recurring with a decreasing frequency over 
time may tell us that a correction action against the mechanism is performing correctly, 
or simply that system maturity or operating experience is precluding future instantiations 
of the mechanism. Either way, it is not the purview of APA to enforce actions based on 
interpretations of an anomaly trend, but rather to provide data that can help a program to 
perform trending in a meaningful way. 
 
The APA process specifies that trending be performed for all anomalies graded for either 
Observation & Trending or Risk Modeling. This is because anomalous conditions that 
are regarded as being most critical should be given the full spectrum of analysis 
available, to allow decision makers to make the best-informed judgments regarding 
corrective/preventative actions. 
 
As detailed in Section 3.2.3, a generalization group gathers together related anomalies, 
the anomalies in each generalization group represent suitable populations for the purpose 
of trending. Trending analysis requires a number of data-points (anomaly recurrences) in 
order to produce a trend, thus each generalization group containing multiple anomalies 
defines the foundation for a trending population. Figure 3-9 shows a notional collection 
of generalization groups (expanding on Figure 3-3) and their respective trending 
populations. 
 
 
Figure 3-9 Generalization Groups and Trending Analysis 
 
Whenever an anomalous condition is recommended for Trending, it is actually the 
observed anomalies within the same Generalization Group that are recommended for 
trending. Trending can only be performed on observed anomalies that actually occur 
within the system and NOT on any of the postulated anomalous conditions produced 
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during the APA process of generalization. Every anomalous condition within a 
generalization group is fundamentally related by the anomaly failure mechanism acting 
on the generic component type; therefore any recurrences of anomalies within the group 
tells us something about the potential for the anomaly failure mechanism to recur within 
the generic component type. Thus, anomaly trends can be utilized to inform conclusions 
on the anomalous conditions within the same generalization group. Figure 3-10 illustrates 
this concept. 
 
 
Figure 3-10 Trending Informs the Group 
 
The extent to which trending can be performed depends largely on the availability of 
recurrent anomalies within a group. For example, if an anomalous condition is 
recommended for Observation & Trending or Risk Modeling and it is found that there are 
none or very few instances of recurring anomalies within the group, the population of 
data points in a trend may be insufficient to reliably infer any conclusions. Under such 
circumstances the trending activity may be limited to data gathering pending the 
generation of sufficient information to produce such a trending analysis. 
 
 
 
Trending the recurrences of related observed anomalies can be conducted using various 
analytical techniques. If a trending process already exists within the program then it 
should be utilized to perform the trending analysis. If such a trending activity is not 
established, there is some trending advice detailed in Appendix E. 
 
3.5.1 Using Trending Data as Evidence 
 
Once an anomalous condition goes through the APA process steps of Generalization, 
Evidence Gathering, and Grading it is recommended for one of three further actions. If 
that action is Risk Modeling then sufficient resources are brought to bear in order to 
characterize the overall risk significance of the underlying failure mechanism. If an 
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The observed anomalies within a generalization group form the population for trending 
anomaly fault magnitude and frequency of recurrence. Trending analyses can be utilized to 
inform conclusions for all anomalous conditions within the same generalization group. 
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anomalous condition is recommended for Observation & Trending, there lies the 
potential that over time, subsequent trending analysis will signify that it represents a 
higher risk to the system (higher than „moderate‟), and should warrant scenario-based 
risk modeling. APA supports a technique that enables adjustments to be made to such 
anomalous conditions based on trending results, in order to escalate its recommended 
action to the appropriate level. This technique is essentially composed of a feedback loop 
within the APA process.  
 
As detailed in Section 3.4 (Grading Anomalous Conditions) the assignment of FCI and 
CCI is rooted in supporting evidence. If a trending analysis has been conducted (or 
updated) for a generalization group, it can now be utilized as evidence for assigning an 
appropriate FCI and CCI. For example, a trending analysis may indicate that a large crack 
in a fluid line (fault magnitude) is more likely to occur than previously expected, and thus 
it is more likely to produce the failure condition of concern. The grading team can utilize 
the trending analysis as supporting evidence to increase the anomalous condition‟s FCI, 
resulting in a higher PPI. This technique of adjusting grading indices based on trending 
updates ensures that the APA recommended further actions are kept up-to date and reflect 
the system‟s current risk as indicated by observed failure mechanisms. 
 
 
Figure 3-11 Trending Data Feedback Process 
 
3.5.2 Trending Parameters 
 
Trending can be carried out on a variety of anomaly parameters that are fundamental to 
the concept of recurrence; fault magnitude, PPI (which represents the perceived risk, in 
the context of APA), and frequency. It is useful to consider these parameters individually; 
as one parameter may signify a converse trend to any other given parameter. Any 
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conclusions inferred from trending analyses must be based on the merits of the individual 
case (for example a decrease in anomaly frequency may actually signify an increase in 
system risk if the trend in fault magnitude is seen to be increasing to significant levels). 
Trending multiple parameters for a given group of related anomalies helps to provide a 
comprehensive set of data in order for informed decisions to be made regarding 
corrective action on recurring failure mechanisms.  
 
3.5.2.1 Fault Magnitude Trending 
 
One of the main objectives of the APA process is to identify anomalies which occur with 
benign magnitudes but might recur with a greater magnitude; representing a potentially 
greater threat to system safety. Trending the magnitude of an anomaly provides an 
informed understanding of this potential. It is important that trends in anomaly magnitude 
are interpreted on the specific merits of the scenario in question; trends (or lack of trends) 
can portend various characteristics of system operation. Trends that show decreasing 
magnitude in anomaly recurrence can provide evidential basis that a corrective action is 
successful; conversely the same decreasing trend may actually be in response to a 
reduced demand on the component and does not signify any reduction in system risk. A 
trend signifying increasing magnitude in anomaly recurrence may imply that the causal 
mechanism is growing with time (or system operation) or that barriers between the causal 
mechanism and component failure are deteriorating or ineffective.  
 
In order to trend magnitude, the anomaly must entail a measurable physical parameter by 
which to apply a magnitude scale. Magnitude trending cannot be applied to binary types 
of anomaly e.g. a fuel-line valve fails open or closed, instead it would have to consist of a 
valve delay (measured in time) or mechanical sluggishness (speed of valve 
closure/opening). One of the initial tasks in fault magnitude trending involves 
establishing those measurable physical parameters, examples include: 
 
 Crack size  
 
 Leak rate (volume per unit time, volume per operation) 
 
 Power supply over-current  
 
 Valve open/close delay 
 
Techniques for trending anomaly fault magnitude can vary based on both the system and 
the specific characteristics of the anomalies in question. It is not the purview of APA to 
prescribe trending techniques; it is the program‟s decision to implement techniques most 
appropriate to them. Figure 3-12 illustrates some sample trending techniques. 
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Figure 3-12 Sample Anomaly Fault Magnitude Trends 
 
3.5.2.2 PPI Trending 
 
PPI represents the perceived risk that an anomalous condition poses to the safety of the 
system (specifically the likelihood for the failure mechanism to propagate to the defined 
severe consequence). As discussed in Section 3.5.1, a trend in anomaly recurrences can 
be used as evidence in the Grading process to adjust FCI or CCI; once a PPI has been 
updated this way there is now a change in PPI. This adjustment of the PPI based on what 
the system is telling us today, is the mechanism that can create PPI trends. Each time an 
updated trending analysis is used as evidence to update the FCI or CCI, the PPI trend 
provides a record of the Grading team‟s interpretation of the potential risk that the trend 
and the anomalous condition presents.  
 
Anomaly fault magnitude and anomaly frequency trends convey the pattern of failure 
mechanism recurrences on the specific component that has experienced the recurring 
observed anomalies (and possibly within a certain timeframe/mission phase). PPI trends 
do not show patterns of real-life anomaly recurrences, instead they illustrate patterns in 
the perceived risk of the postulated anomalous conditions created during generalization. 
Those anomalous conditions represent the possible instantiations where the failure 
mechanism could occur under different circumstances from the anomaly (different 
locations, magnitudes or times). Thus, PPI trends of anomalous conditions demonstrate 
how an anomaly trend is affecting system safety in other areas and other circumstances 
than would be communicated by anomaly trends alone. 
 
The PPI trend is a useful method for communicating how recurring anomalies may 
impact risks at various locations and times throughout the system. Decision makers can 
utilize this piece of information to highlight areas of deteriorating safety and leverage it 
to garner the attention required to implement corrective action resources. A PPI trend 
does not infer any causation as to why the implied risk is increasing or decreasing; 
system experts will need to „drill down‟ through the workings of the trend (anomaly 
frequency/magnitude, failure modes, causal mechanisms etc.) in order to identify the root 
cause of the trend. 
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Figure 3-13 demonstrates the PPI trend from a sample generalization group; recurring 
anomalies are shown along the bottom axis, occurring intermittently between grading 
sessions G1, G2, and G3. Anomalous Condition 1 is recommended for Observation & 
Trending in the first grading session and trending analysis is conducted for the recurring 
anomalies and is utilized in the second grading session as evidence for re-assessing the 
anomalous conditions‟ PPIs. The grading team‟s re-assessment of the PPI, in light of the 
new trending data, results in an increased perceived risk of propagating to severe 
consequences (increased PPI), and the anomalous condition is subsequently  
recommended for Risk Modeling. 
 
 
Figure 3-13 PPI Trend of a Generalization Group 
 
3.5.2.3 Anomaly Frequency Trending 
 
Trending anomaly frequency rates evaluates the pattern of recurrence of anomalies to 
determine the degree to which anomalies of that type are becoming more (or less) 
common. Frequency trends of anomaly recurrences can be indicative of many issues; 
they can indicate that a causal mechanism has not been fully investigated or that the 
causal mechanism has not been fully addressed or understood (perhaps a corrective action 
has been put in-place but the anomaly is still recurring). Without conducting trending 
analyses the occurrences of the failure mechanism may go without further investigation 
other than to „safe‟ the system for immediate flight after each occurrence. Conducting a 
frequency trend of such anomalies with an appropriate trending basis may reveal that the 
causal mechanism is recurring with an increasing rate during operation and may warrant 
time and resources to properly identify and address the causal mechanism. Precluding 
future occurrences of recurring mechanisms not only reduces system risk but also 
minimizes resource expenditure for future „safing‟ of the system for immediate flight. In 
accordance with the „Graded‟ approach to systems engineering the cost of 
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investigation/corrective action for recurring anomalies must be in accordance with the 
risk significance concluded from any trending analyses. 
 
A frequency trend is not considered to be a relevant piece of evidence applicable to the 
APA grading process because the grading indices are conditional on the occurrence of the 
anomaly failure mechanism. This effectively assigns a probability of unity to anomaly 
occurrence, a conservative stance based on the fact that the failure mechanism is 
operative in the system, as evidenced by the anomaly. That is not to say that frequency 
trending is not useful in safety engineering and system reliability per se; it is just that 
frequency trends are not part of the feedback loop within APA. If a trending program 
which incorporates frequency trending already exists for the system, then it should be 
performed according to normal practice. Those frequency trends may also provide 
valuable input to the Risk Modeling activity (see section 3.6). 
 
It is useful to construct a few simple trend plots that often convey strong evidence of the 
presence or absence of a frequency trend. Examples of such techniques include 
Cumulative Frequency Plots and Duane Plots (samples shown in Figure 3-14). APA does 
not prescribe specific techniques for conducting frequency trending; it is the program‟s 
decision to implement techniques most appropriate to them. 
 
 
Figure 3-14 Sample Duane & Cumulative Frequency Plots 
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3.6 Risk Modeling 
 
Risk modeling is indicated for anomalous conditions above the upper threshold for 
observation and trending. The rationale is that a high PPI grading of an anomalous 
condition warrants a deeper understanding of its risk implications. The grading step 
serves as a relatively rapid assessment of potential risk in order to determine which 
anomalous conditions need detailed attention, in the form of risk modeling. Unlike the 
grading process which was already completed, the risk modeling step is a quantitative 
assessment of the likelihood for severe consequence that is presented by the anomalous 
condition.   
 
In accordance with the graded approach to system safety modeling specified in 
NASA/SP-2010-580 [6], the level of detail of the risk modeling should be commensurate 
with the magnitude of the risk. For example, if it is found that a risk model already exists 
for the anomalous condition, then the upshot of the risk modeling activity should be a 
potential change in the predicted frequency, reflecting the fact that elements of the 
affected scenarios have been observed, rather than a complete replacement of the existing 
risk model.  To that effect, the risk modeling activity is meant to leverage existing 
analyses wherever possible.  If a mature system risk model exists, it may be used to 
quantify the risk of the potential anomalous condition. If the existing model does not 
model the anomalous condition, then the condition should be modeled as it would 
integrate into the risk model. 
 
If an existing system risk model does not exist, then the risk modeling step may be 
performed through any standard probabilistic modeling technique, chosen at the 
discretion of the risk modeler.  These types of techniques may include, but are not limited 
to:  Physical Simulation Modeling, Event Tree Modeling, Fault Tree Modeling, or Event 
Sequence Diagram Modeling.  
3.6.1 Anomalous Condition Risk Importance 
 
Observation & Trending Summary 
 
• Anomalous Conditions recommended for Observation & Trending or Risk Modeling are 
trended  
• Related anomalies are grouped by failure mechanisms acting upon component types 
(Generalization Groups) 
• If an anomalous condition is recommended for Observation & Trending or Risk Modeling, 
it is the observed anomalies within the generalization group that are trended 
• Trending Analysis includes frequency of occurrence as well as magnitude of occurrence 
• PPI is trended to communicate potential risk significance changes related to anomaly 
recurrences 
– Decision makers can use this to drill down through the trending analysis to 
identify the trend driver(s) - In order to better focus corrective actions to have the 
greatest risk impact 
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Risk modeling (in the context of APA) is performed to specifically measure the risk 
significance of the anomalous condition, and to do so in the context of a benchmark 
system risk (Ro).  The APA process defines the Anomaly Condition Risk Importance 
(ACRI) measure to assist in gauging and prioritizing anomalous conditions in terms of 
risk. ACRI, the mathematical basis for which is discussed in detail in Appendix F, is the 
conditional risk that is directly attributable to a failure mechanism occurring outside 
nominal bounds (thereby creating an anomalous condition). The metric is not intended to 
provide a complete picture of the anomalous condition‟s risk, but merely a mean, 
comparative measure by which to take a top-level view of the risk. As its name implies, 
this risk metric is conditional, i.e. it presumes the anomalous condition exists. The ACRI 
is calculated as: 
 
oRonditionAnomalousCRiskonditionAnomalousCRiskACRI /)]|()|[(  
Equation 5 
 
The second term in the equation for ACRI is needed to remove any risk contributions that 
are not directly attributable to the anomalous condition, such as that due to random 
failures of modeled safety systems. This also removes the unrelated contributions that are 
due to the choice of model scope. For example, a detailed model that includes all the 
components of a subsystem will typically show more risk than a subsystem model that is 
restricted to the components directly involved in the anomalous condition.  
 
When a system risk model exists, the system risk Ro can be taken from the model. In 
cases where a system risk model does not exist, Ro must be obtained by other means in 
order to provide a normalization factor against which risk significance can be established. 
One possible basis for normalization, in the absence of a calculated risk, is the system 
risk requirement, which establishes a de facto acceptable risk. Note that assuming an Ro 
of 0 (meaning the system has absolutely no risk) leads to an ACRI of infinity – this 
makes sense since a system with no risk should not be experiencing anomalies in the first 
place. 
 
Keep in mind that it is imperative that the same benchmark be used in calculating the 
ACRI for all system anomalous conditions since this is actually a comparative measure 
that should be used for prioritizing where resources should be spent to maintain the 
benchmark level of risk. In this regard, an analogy is noted between the ACRI measure 
and the Risk Achievement Worth importance measure [17], which indicates features that 
are of most interest to maintain the present level of risk, and are thus of special interest in 
reliability assurance programs and inspection and enforcement activities. 
 
If the benchmark is updated, it should be applied retroactively to all previous ACRI 
estimates to ensure a common yardstick. Note that since Ro is a constant within the 
program/project that it is applied, pair wise comparisons in the form of ACRI ratios can 
also be used to assess the importance of anomalous conditions in relation to each other. In 
this case the actual value of Ro becomes irrelevant since it factors out of the equation. 
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3.6.2 Risk Modeling Outcomes 
 
The risk modeling activity entails assessing the likelihood of creating a severe 
consequence through probabilistic means, and modeling the relationships among sources 
of risk and their impacts. The model should aim to identify the sources and nature of risk 
in conjunction with the uncertainty associated with the anomalous condition. The goal of 
any risk modeling activity is to identify the parameter(s) or area(s) within the scope of the 
anomalous condition that is contributing the greatest level of system risk. By identifying 
the origins of risk, one can be better prepared to make decisions about how to mitigate it. 
 
The outcomes of risk modeling activities should be reported to top-level management in 
an effort to make them aware of the failure mechanisms active in the system, and the 
operational vulnerabilities that can arise from them.  By effectively communicating these 
risks, management can make risk-informed decisions about how the system should be 
operated and what design modifications must be made to ensure safe operation. 
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4 Documentation of Process Steps and Reporting 
Results 
 
The process of analyzing observed anomalies to identify potential precursors involves 
numerous tasks: data mining, brainstorming activities, evidence gathering and working 
sessions. These tasks must be documented in order to provide a robust record of the 
analysis process and to communicate the results effectively so that informed decisions 
regarding the safe operation of the system can be made.  
 
The purpose of reporting the risk results to top-level management is to: 
 
 Make them aware of failure mechanisms in the system for which the risk may be 
underappreciated 
 
 Highlight system vulnerabilities, thereby supporting risk-informed system 
modification 
 
Management can decide, based on a risk-informed picture, how the system should be 
operated, and what design modifications must be made to ensure flight safety. The APA 
process does not prescribe definitive actions to be followed once an anomalous condition 
passes over a certain risk threshold, the process of correcting these potential problems 
and/or addressing the risk is specific to each program and its management.  
 
Each program has its own style of risk management and reporting practices; however in 
practical applications of the process it has been found that there are generally 3 main 
steps to reporting APA results: 
 
1. Declare the scope and timeframe of the anomalies reviewed (i.e. “All in-flight 
anomalies generated from Sept 1, 2009 to June, 2010”) 
 
2. Show how the anomalies were generalized and how the anomalous conditions 
were graded 
 
3. Report the ACRI for all anomalous conditions graded for Risk Modeling 
 
Details of the APA results can be presented in many formats, at the discretion of the 
management responsible for making APA-informed decisions, some examples of results 
used during pilot applications of the process are shown in Appendix G. 
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4.1 Reports from DAnGERS 
 
At various points in the process, specific outputs in the form of reporting methods and 
formats have been defined to facilitate the dissemination of information in a standard and 
consistent fashion. 
 
There are a variety of standardized forms and reports recommended as outputs from the 
APA process, and are automatically produced from the DAnGERS tool; example 
documents are shown in Appendix D: 
 
Document 1: Anomaly Review Report 
 A list of all the observed anomalies from the caseload 
 Identifies which anomalies have been reviewed for generalization and which ones 
are awaiting review 
 Communicates the level of progress (how many observed anomalies from the 
caseload have been reviewed) achieved by the Generalization team 
 
Document 2: Evidence Gathering Report 
 A report listing the details of all the anomalous conditions that are awaiting 
grading (ones that have been recommended for grading but not graded yet) 
 Serves as a hand-off document from the generalization task for the evidence 
gathering activity, data mining personnel use this report to structure their research 
 
Document 3: System Type List 
 A list of the anomalous conditions that are awaiting grading broken up by their 
respective system type (APA practitioners can select which system to display 
using DAnGERS interface) 
 This report is particularly useful for scheduling attendance of system experts 
during grading sessions, and communicates to management the volume of 
anomalous conditions to be graded 
 
Document 4: Low Detail Report 
 A summary report communicating the key APA details of all graded anomalous 
conditions 
 Useful for providing a concise overview of current APA grading activities 
 
Document 5: High Detail Report 
 Builds on document 4, capturing the more detailed analysis of the grading activity 
 The High Detail report contains all the details for a selected Generalization 
Group. The material contained in this report is specific to the Generalization 
Group selected using the DAnGERS user-interface 
 Includes details of all observed anomalies and anomalous conditions within the 
generalization group, including evidence used for assigning FCI and CCI 
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5 Application to Other Mission Classes 
 
Throughout the development phases of precursor analysis the method has been applied to 
Earth-to-Orbit transportation systems and crewed orbital science platforms; however the 
process in principle is valid for other mission classes (e.g., crewed and uncrewed orbital 
platforms, crewed lunar and planetary outposts, deep-space robotic missions, and other 
human space exploration missions). One category of mission class that is currently in 
operation at NASA that may benefit from a tailored derivative of precursor analysis is 
robotic space exploration.  
 
The principle objective of precursor analysis is applicable for both crewed and uncrewed 
systems; assessing the history of operational anomalies to identify which anomaly failure 
mechanisms could potentially manifest themselves as problems in the future. Much can 
be learned from anomalies occurring on robotic platforms just as those onboard crewed 
vehicles; they have the potential to portend the future. Anomalies onboard uncrewed 
systems are significant to the extent that they either imply unexpected (out of nominal 
range) performance levels of well-understood elements or reveal risks that were 
misunderstood prior to the anomaly occurrence. For non-human related missions, the 
objective of a precursor analysis would focus on identifying underappreciated risks to 
system reliability rather than safety. 
 
Uncrewed robotic exploration missions represent fundamentally different challenges 
from those crewed systems that precursor analysis has currently been applied to. Robotic 
missions entail a diverse range of functional systems (e.g. remote sensing, geological 
sampling, atmospheric entry descent & landing, surface roving); they operate in a wide 
variety of environmental conditions (e.g. deep space, atmospheric pressures and weather, 
radiation belts); the mission timeframes can be comparatively long and the inability to 
physically interact with the system (being able to repair any failure mechanisms) 
precludes many in-situ corrective actions when anomalies are encountered during a 
mission. Typically, when an anomaly is discovered during a robotic mission the 
corrective actions available are to: use as-is, update software on either ground or flight 
systems, or procedural modifications. Since the safety and reliability cycle of identify, 
fix, and fly (as traditionally applied to the STS and ISS programs) is not available for 
robotic missions, precursor analysis would have to take a different tack to identifying and 
addressing potential precursors. Rather than limiting the analysis to a single system or 
mission, operational anomalies would have to be used to identify failure mechanisms that 
could portend the potential for more severe consequences within an altogether different 
system or mission. Although robotic missions involve an array of different systems and 
subsystems, they are often designed to perform similar functions or operate in similar 
environments. For example, an anomaly that occurs within a Mars rover due to an 
atmospheric failure mechanism (dust ingress) is applicable to any other robotic system 
designed to operate within the same environment. Even though the scope for generalizing 
failure mechanisms within each individual robotic system may be significantly limited 
when compared to the STS or ISS, the APA process of generalizing failure mechanisms 
to other circumstances may be beneficial to robotic missions in an institutional sense. 
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This technique of analyzing anomalies across a range of historical missions may already 
be carried out in current risk management practices; however precursor analysis may 
provide an alternative method of structuring anomaly analysis across missions. 
  
As discussed, the main requirement from a program in order to conduct precursor 
analysis is a source of operational anomalies with a means of identifying their causal 
mechanisms. NASA robotic missions currently report and record anomalous events and 
flight task data in electronic databases. If the practice is comparable to anomaly reporting 
and recording processes employed within the STS and ISS program (both of which have 
yielded suitable data sources to initiate precursor analysis) and depending on the level of 
information recorded in such anomaly reports, then data sources such as this could 
provide suitable caseloads for robotic cross-mission precursor analysis.  
 
The typical practice of continuously analyzing anomalies through APA on a cyclical 
basis may not be the most appropriate review method for robotic missions, as so many 
anomalies are very specific to the hardware, conditions and the environment in which 
they occur and their causal mechanisms may not be applicable to other missions. Instead 
a triggering mechanism for reviewing records might be more appropriate, where 
anomalies occurring in systems with equivalent hardware/operating conditions onboard 
other missions (both current missions and future ones in the design phase) are flagged for 
precursor analysis. Details of such a mechanism could be developed in further studies 
into precursor analysis for other mission types. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The precursor analysis process described in this document is designed to be a practical, 
implementable means of identifying underappreciated sources of risk in NASA space 
systems, as evidenced by anomalous events that occur during the operation of the system. 
Once these sources of risk are identified, they can be brought into the overall system risk 
model, maintaining a current and consistent knowledge of risk that uses all available 
information. In some cases, design or operating practice will be adjusted to mitigate to 
the newly realized risk. Either way, a pathway is provided to reduce the gap between 
model and reality in an iterative and continuous fashion. Maintaining this correspondence 
between model and reality is conducive to sound risk-informed decision-making. Without 
it, decisions may be made that unknowingly accept a significant risk based on little or no 
actual evidence of the prevalence for the underlying conditions.  
 
The process implements a graded approach to analysis, using screening and qualitative 
grading in order to focus subsequent monitoring and analytical attention only on those 
potential failure situations that warrant it, based on their risk grading (PPI). Anomalous 
conditions with low PPIs are recommended for no further action; those with moderate 
PPIs are recommended for continued observation and trending; and those with high PPIs 
are recommended for explicit risk modeling. Risk modeling includes scenario-based 
modeling techniques to identify specific potential engineering vulnerabilities that can be 
addressed by subsequent testing, analysis, design change, or procedural modification. As 
such, it leverages existing anomaly data in a manner that provides a maximum potential 
for systemic risk reduction. 
 
Although grading employs qualitative analysis, the rationales used to assign the PPI are 
expected to be grounded in solid evidence. When the evidence is weak, the grading is 
biased conservatively (toward more observation or analysis rather than less). The 
conservatism of the grading increases as the evidence caliber decreases, assuring that 
situations with large uncertainty are handled conservatively. This ties the process to high-
confidence estimates as opposed to mean values. 
 
To date, the APA process has been applied to two NASA programs, STS (both Orbiter 
and SRB) and the ISS. Over time, the process has evolved to adapt and integrate with the 
specific requirements of each program‟s risk management practices. To illustrate one of 
these adaptations, in pilot applications to the STS program APA was only concerned with 
1 severe consequence, LOC/LOV (at the direction of program risk management) and the 
generalization process only took into account anomalous conditions that could result in 
LOC/LOV. APA was later applied to the ISS program, risk management practices within 
this program focus on Loss of Science (LOS) and Loss of Mission (LOM) consequences 
in addition to LOC/LOV. In the interest of capturing anomalous conditions that could 
potentially result in LOS and LOM, the process was refined to allow consideration of 
multiple severe consequences during generalization. Each step in the process can be 
tailored in various ways so that APA provides the best possible method of identifying 
potential precursors within the system.  
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Up to this point methods and processes for evaluating and grading anomalous conditions, 
as well as modeling and quantifying their risk significance, have been presented, but in 
the end the process, by its very name, implies the identification of accident precursors. 
However, the fact of the matter is that the process, in and of its self, does not designate 
precursors. This is because an accident precursor is defined not so much by the absolute 
values of the risk significance measures but instead by the way that those risk 
significance measures are interpreted by a program. Thus, it is the responsibility of the 
program, if it so chooses, to define criteria by which to designate an anomalous condition 
(whether actually observed or postulated) as an accident precursor. 
 
For example, a program may choose to define as precursors those anomalies in any 
generalization group containing an anomalous condition with a risk measurement (ACRI) 
at or above a program-defined threshold. 
 
It is important that once the criteria are defined, they be adhered to, since not doing so 
relegates the program to the subjective type of attention given to anomalies that APA is 
attempting to remedy. Once an anomalous condition has been designated as an accident 
precursor, risk modeling (PVI) provides a means of focusing program resources upon the 
parameters and system states that either require more information or are explicitly driving 
the failure propagation to severe consequences. 
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Appendix A -  Acronyms 
 
ACRI – Anomaly Condition Risk Importance 
APA – Accident Precursor Analysis 
ASAP – Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
ASP – Accident Sequence Precursor 
BCDU – Battery Charge/Discharge Unit 
CCI – Conditional Consequence Index 
CDR – Critical Design Review 
DAnGERS – Deliberative Anomaly Grading & Evaluation for Risk Significance 
DC – Data Caliber 
EC – Evidence Caliber 
EMU – Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
ET – External Tank 
EVA – Extravehicular Activity 
FCI – Failure Condition Index 
FCOC – Failure Condition of Concern 
FESD – Functional Event Sequence Diagram 
FMEA – Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
HAZOP – Hazard and Operability 
IFA – In-Flight Anomalies 
IFI – Item For Investigation 
ISS – International Space Station 
JSC – Johnson Space Center 
LDI – Local Data Interface 
LOC – Loss of Crew 
LOM – Loss of Mission 
LOS – Loss of Science 
LOV – Loss of Vehicle 
MAS – Mission Assurance System 
MER – Mission Evaluation Room 
NLGD – Nose Landing Gear Door 
NPR – NASA Procedural Requirements 
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
OMS – Orbital Maneuvering System 
OSMA – Office of Safety and Mission Assurance  
PDR – Preliminary Design Review 
PPI – Potential Problem Index 
PRA – Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
PRACA – Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
PRCB – Program Requirements Control Board 
RCC – Reinforced Carbon-Carbon 
RCS – Reaction Control System 
S&MA – Safety and Mission Assurance 
SRB – Solid Rocket Booster 
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SSU – Sequential Shunt Unit 
STS – Space Transportation System 
TPS – Thermal Protection System 
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Appendix C -  The Tool for Deliberative Anomaly 
Grading and Evaluation of Risk Significance 
(DAnGERS) 
 
DAnGERS is a software tool that is available to NASA to support generalization and 
grading exercises. The tool shown herein was developed for the ISS program and field-
tested during numerous pilot applications (a Space Shuttle variant of DAnGERS also 
exists). It serves as a representative example of how to apply the process in a structured 
application. 
 
The tool supports generalization of observed anomalies and grading of anomalous 
conditions by structuring and documenting the discussion of each anomaly record, 
including the evidentiary basis for the findings of the discussion. When sufficient data 
has been collected and input for a given anomalous condition, DAnGERS uses a series of 
metrics and calculations to automatically assign a “Potential Problem Index” (PPI) for it, 
which is used to generate a recommendation for further analysis. 
 
The following sections provide a step-by step overview of how to operate and complete 
DAnGERS during precursor analysis exercises. The structure of this guide corresponds to 
the flow of the tool, and is designed to be operated in two working-session environments; 
Anomaly Review & Generalization, and Grading. 
 
Examples shown in this appendix are notional, though derived from events that occurred 
on the ISS. 
 
C.1 DAnGERS Main Menu 
 
The main menu for the tool enables the user to launch various modules of the tool. Five 
options are displayed; „Import Data‟, ‟Generalization‟, „Grading‟, „Reports‟ and „Upload 
to MAS‟. Clicking on any of these buttons will launch a separate form that takes the user 
through the steps to complete each process. 
 
DAnGERS requires a caseload of anomalous events to be imported in order to evaluate 
that data using the APA process. The „Import Data‟ module allows records to be added to 
the database within the tool, a caseload of anomaly records can either be created 
manually (using MS Excel) or existing anomaly reporting tools can be utilized to 
generate caseloads and imported into DAnGERS. Once the tool contains a caseload ready 
for evaluation, the button labeled „Generalization‟ will launch the user interface for the 
generalization process step, displaying the Anomaly Review page. The „Grading‟ button 
launches the module used for the grading process step, to be used following evidence 
gathering. The „Reports‟ button launches a menu which shows all of the available 
methods of report generation, these may be generated at any time throughout an APA 
cycle, and a variety of reports are available to reflect the appropriate level of detail 
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desired. Finally, the „Upload to MAS‟ button launches a module that uploads the 
information contained within DAnGERS to a prototype precursor information repository 
within the ISS Mission Assurance System (MAS), an online NASA data management 
tool that enables NASA personnel to remotely view, track, and download Safety and 
Mission Assurance related information. 
 
 
Figure C-1 ISS DAnGERS Main Menu 
 
C.2 Generalization 
 
Once a caseload has been imported into the tool the „Generalization‟ form can be 
launched, and will display the first tab of the generalization form, the „Anomaly Review‟ 
tab.  This page shows caseload data for each anomaly as shown in the Anomaly Title 
field at the top of the page.  
 
The data displayed within the grey area directly corresponds to the caseload data 
imported into the tool (Figure C-2); it provides sufficient information to characterize the 
anomaly scenario for the group, so that each member has a clear understanding of the 
anomaly for which they are reviewing. 
 
Once the anomaly information has been reviewed by the group, they will discuss the 
identification of the anomaly failure mechanism. A list of example failure mechanisms is 
available via a drop-down menu; these have been generated through the experience of 
numerous APA working sessions and provide a useful „go-to‟ list for the generalization 
team to consider when deliberating an appropriate failure mechanism. In some cases, the 
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record of an anomaly may be insufficient to support the grading activity, as would be the 
case if a failure mechanism for the observed anomaly could not be identified. In such a 
case, the user may simply note the data insufficiency, record any remarks on the level of 
available information, and proceed to the next anomaly record. Consideration of records 
like these may be deferred pending additional information, and continued when that 
information becomes available.  
 
Below the failure mechanism section there is a control for recording the operational 
phase of the program that the anomaly occurred under, the options are; On-Orbit, Ground 
Ops, or Other. This field is present for differentiating certain activities (testing) that may 
result in anomalies occurring outside of the ISS operational envelope.  
 
The final data collected on the Anomaly Review page records the System, Subsystem, 
Flight Element and component in which the observed anomaly occurred (Figure C-2). A 
detailed taxonomy of the ISS architecture is contained within the tool, the DAnGERS 
operator can select the appropriate location of the anomaly from the drop-down menus. 
This procedure of identifying the location of the observed anomaly is helpful for 
characterizing the anomaly, as well as setting the stage for the generalization process that 
will follow. 
 
 
Figure C-2 Anomaly Review Page 
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C.2.1 Component Type 
 
The next step of the generalization process identifies the generic component type. 
Generalization is constrained to the generic component type that experienced the 
observed anomaly. The Generalization team will discuss and determine the generic 
component type within the context of the observed anomaly. 
 
The Generic Component Type field is a dynamic drop-down menu, this means that the 
user can click on the arrow and see a list of generic component types or they can type in 
their own generic component type into the text box. New entries that are typed-in are 
added to the list so that it will be visible in the drop-down menu in future. This means 
that the first time the tool is used the list will be blank, but the list will grow as new 
generic component types are identified. 
 
 
Figure C-3 Component Type Page 
 
C.2.2 Generalization Group 
 
Generalization groups are a useful way of grouping together similar anomalies. On the 
Generalization Group page, the tool will display any groups that have a matching failure 
mechanism and component type to the observed anomaly. If there are no groups 
displayed on this page, it is because there have been no previous anomalies that match 
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this criteria (Shown in Figure C-4) In this case, a new generalization group is be created 
and assigned to the observed anomaly by the operator.  
 
If the observed anomaly‟s failure mechanism and component type match an existing 
generalization group within the tool, then the matching group will be displayed as soon as 
the page is visible. In this case the team will review the information displayed regarding 
the failure mechanism and component type, if the observed anomaly is deemed to „fit‟ 
within the generalization group, the DAnGERS operator will assign it to the group. If the 
generalization group displayed does not adequately match the observed anomaly, then the 
„Create New‟ button can be used to create a new group. 
 
 
Figure C-4 Generalization Group - New Group 
 
C.2.3 Generalization 
 
Each component within the scope of the generic component type is evaluated to identify 
other locations or time frames that are susceptible to the same failure mechanism, and 
which could potentially lead to more severe consequences.  
 
The question at the top of page (“In what other….” Figure C-5) directs the team members 
to generalize the failure mechanism to other components within the generic component 
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type. Additionally, the team is asked to consider other activities under which the failure 
mechanism could lead to more severe consequences.  
 
Information displayed in the blue form corresponds to the observed anomaly data entered 
on the „Anomaly Review‟ page. At this step, the component in the observed anomaly is 
known, however the team must identify the timeframe in which the observed anomaly 
occurred (and could lead to more severe consequences), the failure condition of concern 
(FCOC) that could be created, and the severe consequence that potentially would have 
resulted from the accident progression. 
 
 
Figure C-5 Sample Generalization Page 1 
 
As the group begins to generalize the anomaly failure mechanism to other locations and 
times, the DAnGERS operator will correspondingly create new anomalous conditions 
with varying susceptible components and activities until all potentially more severe 
anomalous conditions are recorded.  A generalization team may wish to assess a scenario 
for its potential to produce two severe consequences; this can be accomplished by 
duplicating the record and selecting the two different options for severe consequence.  
 
The goal at this point is to determine the scope of anomalous conditions that could be 
forwarded to the grading exercise, making efforts to identify all locations and time frames 
where the anomaly failure mechanism has the potential to lead to severe consequences, 
while also minimizing the number of ultimately insignificant anomalous conditions. 
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Figure C-6 Completed Generalization Page 
 
C.2.4 Recommendations for Grading 
 
This page of the tool displays a summary of all the current data generated from the 
generalization process, to provide a picture of the scenario that each anomalous condition 
presents. The team will deliberate on which anomalous conditions should be pursued for 
Grading, once a conclusion is reached the operator will use the Yes/No radio buttons 
located to the right of each anomalous condition to recommend a subset of anomalous 
conditions for grading. Those that are toggled to „No‟ will NOT be carried on any further 
in the precursor analysis process. 
 
The output of generalization is a set of anomalous conditions deemed worthy of further 
evaluation and grading. Prior to engaging in grading, data on each of the affected 
subsystems needs to be collected, as well as sufficient system-level data to evaluate the 
potential for each failure condition of concern to occur, given the presence of the failure 
mechanism, and the potential for the failure condition of concern to propagate to severe 
consequences. 
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Figure C-7 Recommendations for Grading Page 
 
The last action in the Generalization process is to produce a report of all the pertinent 
data collected so far that will be provided for the evidence gathering personnel. This 
report is produced by DAnGERS automatically by clicking on the „Generate Evidence 
Gathering Report‟ button (See Appendix D for further details on Reports).  
 
C.3 Grading 
 
When sufficient evidence has been gathered for those anomalous conditions which have 
been recommended for grading, a grading session is scheduled with a team of experts to 
review and assess the potential for problems created by each anomalous condition.  To 
begin the grading step, the user must select the „Grading” button from the main menu to 
launch the grading module. 
 
C.3.1 Initial Review 
 
The first page of the grading module presents an overview of the current anomalous 
condition to be graded.  It may be days, weeks, or longer since the generalization session 
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took place which characterized a given anomalous condition, and this page serves to 
refresh the group about the anomalous condition (Figure C-8). 
 
 
Figure C-8 Initial Review of Anomalous Condition 
 
Navigation of the grading module is similar to the generalization module; however the 
„Anomaly Title‟ drop down is replaced with a drop down for selecting anomalous 
conditions.  At this stage, the process is no longer concerned with observed anomalies, 
and instead only considers anomalous conditions.  This drop-down menu uses the 
combination of failure mechanism, subsystem, and component to characterize each 
anomalous condition and facilitate navigation. Additionally, it includes a „Status‟ 
indicator to designate if the anomalous condition has been graded yet or not.  This can be 
useful during a grading session to identify records that have already been evaluated.  
Finally, a „Filter by System‟ drop-down is provided as a means to limit the anomalous 
conditions to only certain systems at a time.  If many anomalous conditions exist for 
many different systems, yet a particular grading team only wishes to review those from 
ONE system, this feature should be used to limit the scope to anomalous conditions 
within that system.  
 78 
 
C.3.2 Refining the Failure Threshold 
 
Before Grading can begin, the threshold for the failure condition of concern must be 
evaluated. The failure condition of concern is identified during the generalization 
process; however it may not explicitly define any threshold for failure to occur.  
 
The group will deliberate on whether a failure threshold is applicable to the 
circumstances. As the discussion progresses, the operator will record notes pertaining to 
the rationale into the notes field below the failure condition textbox. If the consensus 
determines that the current failure condition is not sufficiently defined, the failure 
condition of concern displayed can be edited to reflect the group‟s agreed threshold. 
 
 
Figure C-9 Failure Threshold 
 
C.3.3 Failure Condition Index (FCI) 
 
FCI is assigned based on the likelihood of the “failure condition of concern” occurring, 
given the occurrence of the failure mechanism in the susceptible component.  
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During evaluation of FCI, the grading team identifies the data upon which they are basing 
their FCI assignment, this data is provided by the evidence gathering exercise. The tool 
requires the user to record data relating to the evidence submitted, in order to incorporate 
the caliber of the supporting evidence. This begins with identifying the data type. Click 
on the „Data Type‟ drop-down menu to see a list of relevant data types, and select one 
that matches the evidence (Figure C-10). 
 
 
Figure C-10 Failure Condition Index (FCI) Page (Data Type) 
 
Each piece of evidence must also be assigned an applicability indicating the degree to 
which the objective evidence addresses the potential for the anomalous condition to 
produce the failure condition of concern. The applicability is assigned as a qualitative 
descriptor using the drop-down menu labeled „Applicability to FCI Assessment‟ (Figure 
C-11). 
 
The final text box for FCI evidence recording requires the user to document the data 
source. This must be detailed enough so that a third party can easily locate this piece of 
data at a later date. 
 
Up to three separate sources of evidence can be recorded in the tool, each time entering 
the appropriate data type, evidence, applicability, and data source. Further remarks 
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regarding the FCI assignment, group rationale or any other pertinent information can be 
recorded in the notes section. (See Figure C-12). 
 
 
Figure C-11 Failure Condition Index (FCI) Page (Applicability to FCI) 
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Figure C-12 FCI and CCI Notes Page 
 
Once all the supporting evidence has been completed and documented the FCI can be 
assigned. Grading of the FCI is applied using a list of qualitative descriptors. A drop-
down menu is used to select the most appropriate out of 6 possible qualitative FCI 
descriptors; Very Likely, Likely, Possible, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, and Non-Credible 
(Figure C-13). The group will discuss the merits of each piece of evidence and the 
potential relevance to the assignment of FCI likelihood. 
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Figure C-13 FCI Page (Qualitative Descriptors) 
 
The drop-down menu can be selected to display the list of descriptors during the group 
discussion, this will help guide the group to choose which best describes the likelihood of 
progression from failure mechanism to failure condition of concern. 
 
C.3.4 Conditional Consequence Index (CCI) 
 
The Conditional Consequence Index (CCI) indicates the potential that the failure 
condition of concern will result in severe consequences. This is a function of the degree 
to which safeguards or barriers are present to mitigate severe consequences given the 
failure condition of concern. CCI is graded based on the same list of qualitative 
descriptors as the FCI.  
 
The CCI page is representative of the same procedure for assigning an FCI, the design is 
very similar and they can be filled out much in the same way. 
 
Like FCI, the assigned qualitative CCI descriptor must ultimately be based on evidence. 
Hence, the same process for assessing evidence applicability is used for CCI evaluation 
that was used for FCI evaluation. The fields can be completed in the same way as the FCI 
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evidence; „What Evidence Was Provided?‟, „Applicability to CCI Assessment?‟, and 
„Document the Data Source‟. 
 
 
Figure C-14 Conditional Consequence Index (CCI) Page (Completed) 
 
Grading of the CCI is applied using the same list of qualitative descriptors used for 
grading the FCI; Very Likely, Likely, Possible, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, and Non-
Credible. As practiced for FCI, follow the group discussion and select the agreed option. 
A completed sample CCI page is shown in Figure C-14. 
 
C.3.5 Outcome 
 
The Outcome page displays the APA results from the grading process for the anomalous 
condition just evaluated. These results comprise of; the Potential Problem Index (PPI), 
the Evidence Caliber (EC), and Recommended Further Action (Figure C-15 shows a 
completed „Outcome‟ page). 
 
PPI is the metric used in the APA process to grade an anomalous condition for either risk 
modeling, observation and trending, or no further analysis. The Evidence Caliber (EC) is 
a function of the data type and assigned applicability of each piece of supporting data 
used by the grading team when assigning FCI and CCI. 
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Figure C-15 Outcome Page 
 
The recommendation for further action is based directly upon the PPI result. Thresholds 
set during process development dictate the boundaries between actions; „Risk Modeling‟, 
„Observation and Trending‟ and „None‟.  
 
Additional notes on the results of the anomalous condition can be entered into the text 
box provided at the bottom of the screen, labeled „Additional Remarks‟. 
 
This is the final step of grading the anomalous condition. Navigation to the next 
anomalous condition in the series can be carried out using the anomalous condition drop-
down menu, located at the top of the screen. Whenever a new record is selected, the tool 
returns to the „Initial Review‟ page. 
 
C.4 Interface with Mission Assurance System 
 
In addition to the DAnGERS features detailed in the previous sections, prototype 
development has also been completed on a means of integrating the APA process with 
existing NASA mission assurance processes via common data management systems. The 
Mission Assurance System (MAS) is a web-based tool originally developed by the 
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Constellation Program, but has now been adapted by programs and centers including ISS, 
JSC, and KSC to manage Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA), Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and other types of Safety and Mission Assurance 
(S&MA) data. PRACA records are stored within a component of the MAS called the 
Problem Analysis Reporting Tool (PART). The addition of a precursor capability to this 
web-based system allows for the integration of precursor information with corresponding 
anomaly records.  
 
Features established under this effort include data-exchange mechanisms between the 
MAS and the existing Microsoft Access-based precursor tool (DAnGERS) and a 
dedicated precursor database within the MAS environment. Additional products of this 
work include MAS and DAnGERS user-interfaces for the exchange of precursor 
information, and code development for future adoption into the MAS production 
environment. 
 
The basic data-flow in the APA process consists of taking anomaly data from a system, 
analyzing it through precursor evaluation and then producing precursor results. Due to 
the Generalization step in APA, this produces a „one-to many‟ record relationship where 
one anomaly coming into the process can produce multiple precursor records (called 
anomalous conditions). 
 
For the MAS and DAnGERS to be considered fully integrated, it requires two separate 
exchanges of information. One from the PART database within the MAS into 
DAnGERS; this provides DAnGERS with an anomaly caseload for evaluation. Secondly, 
data produced during the precursor analysis (anomalous conditions) can then be uploaded 
to a MAS database dedicated to precursor analysis. The following illustration depicts this 
data-flow between the three systems; PART, DAnGERS, and Precursor MAS. 
 
 
Figure C-16 Precursor Information Pathway 
 
 
Problem Analysis 
Reporting Tool 
(PART) 
DAnGERS 
Anomaly 
Precursor Mission  
Assurance System  
( PMAS ) 
Anomalous Conditions 
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C.4.1 Downloading Records from PART to DAnGERS 
 
The DAnGERS user interface provides a 2-step guide to downloading a caseload of 
anomalies directly from the PART database and importing those records into the tool.  
The user must first choose an ISS system and start/end date for the records to be included 
in the caseload. DAnGERS provides a „System‟ drop-down menu and start and end dates 
fields for selecting these parameters.  Once the parameters for the anomaly caseload have 
been defined, the user can click a „Download Caseload‟ button.  This begins an 
automatically download of an Excel file which contains the specified caseload and is 
formatted for input into DAnGERS.  The user may then import this in the standard 
caseload import method. 
 
C.4.2 Transferring Precursor Records from DAnGERS to MAS 
 
Once the APA process has been carried out for a set of anomalies, the results can be 
uploaded to a database within the MAS environment that is dedicated to precursor 
records, Precursor MAS. Uploading precursor data to MAS is a 2 step process that can be 
completed directly from the DAnGERS user interface.  
 
Step 1 requires the user to click on an „Export Data‟ button in DAnGERS. This causes 
the tool to export an XML file containing details of the records that have been modified 
since the last export was initiated. The XML file of precursor records will be exported 
from the DAnGERS database and saved using a standard Windows „Save As‟ dialogue 
box.  Once the XML file is saved, the second step in the process is uploading the XML 
file to the Precursor version of MAS. Clicking on an „Upload Data‟ button in DAnGERS 
launches the user‟s browser and resolves a Precursor MAS upload page.  Using a 
„Browse‟ button on that page button to launch a File Upload dialogue, the user navigates 
to the location of the saved XML file and selects „Open‟.  This action uploads the XML 
file containing precursor records into the Precursor MAS database.   
 
The Precursor MAS is a dedicated database to precursor data and only contains records 
that have been produced by DAnGERS. The layout and features supported by the tool are 
very similar to current MAS systems, including PART.  
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Appendix D -  DAnGERS Reports 
 
DAnGERS provides a feature that enables the user to produce standardized reports, 
enabling the communication of findings to the relevant Risk Manager, to assist in making 
program decisions relating to safety. The reports module is accessed from the main menu, 
by clicking on the button labeled „Reports‟ 
 
 
Figure D-1 DAnGERS Reports Menu 
 
There are five different types of report that DAnGERS can produce: Anomaly Review 
Report, Evidence Gathering Report, System Type List, Low Detail Report and High 
Detail Report. 
 
D.1 Anomaly Review Report 
 
It is useful to be able to see how many anomalies from the caseload have been reviewed 
for Generalization, this helps to communicate the level of progress made by a 
Generalization team at any given time. The Anomaly Review Report lists all the records 
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from the caseload by ID number, Anomaly Title, and PART #; and identifies whether 
each anomaly has been reviewed or not reviewed. 
 
 
Figure D-2 Anomaly Review Report (ISS Sample) 
 
D.2 Evidence Gathering Report 
 
The Evidence Gathering Report is report intended for use between the generalization and 
grading steps of the APA process.  The report displays a low-detail list of all anomalous 
conditions which have been recommended for grading, but that have not yet been graded.  
It serves as a list for the evidence gatherer, identifying what type of evidence is needed.  
Figure D-3 shows an example of this report. 
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Figure D-3 Evidence Gathering Report (ISS Sample) 
 
D.3 Scheduling System Experts 
 
A typical ISS anomaly caseload will contain many records of anomalies related to diverse 
systems onboard the vehicle. The generalization process expands on this even further to 
consider the failure mechanism occurring on different components within the scope of 
generalization. This can result in the generation of anomalous conditions across many 
systems/subsystems onboard the orbiter. With regards to the grading process, it is prudent 
to organize the grading sessions to make best use of the resources available. One of those 
resources to be used effectively is the time of the systems engineers. ISS DAnGERS 
includes a module designed to aid in scheduling the resources of systems 
engineers/experts for grading sessions. 
 
Once generalization for a caseload has taken place, the process breaks for evidence 
gathering, and reconvenes at a later date for the grading exercise. Before grading begins, 
it is useful for the facilitator or SR&QA manager to know when to include specific 
experts in the upcoming grading session(s). The „System Type‟ module allows users to 
view a list of all the ISS systems that have anomalous conditions associated with them, in 
order to schedule the system engineers who are expert in those fields to be present during 
grading. 
 
The module is launched from the DAnGERS „Reports‟ menu, click on the button labeled 
„System Type List‟. The tool then displays a list of all the systems that have anomalous 
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conditions waiting for grading, as well as the number of anomalous conditions associated 
with each system type. See Figure D-4. 
 
Note – The number of anomalous conditions does NOT include those that are not marked 
‘Recommended for Grading’ or ones that have already been graded in previous sessions. 
 
 
Figure D-4 System Select Page (Sample Table) 
 
To see a more detailed break-down of the anomalous conditions associated with a 
specific system type, follow the on-screen instructions to select a system using the drop-
down menu. The detailed list includes information that summarizes each anomalous 
condition in order to differentiate between each record, the column on the far right 
(Evidence Collected?) is an optional field for SR&QA personnel to manually record if 
evidence has been gathered for the anomalous condition. 
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Figure D-5 Anomalous Conditions Awaiting Grading List (EPS Sample) 
 
D.4 Full Caseload Graded Result List (Low Detail Report) 
 
The Full-Caseload Graded Result List (Figure D-6) is a low-detail summary report 
containing the key identifying aspects of each anomalous condition over the full 
caseload. Details for each anomalous condition include: Failure Mechanism, Failure 
Condition of Concern, Severe Consequence, PPI, EC, Graded Result (Recommended 
further action), and several other fields which help to characterize the anomalous 
condition.  
 
Note: This report will only display the anomalous conditions that have already been 
graded. It will NOT include those waiting grading or those NOT marked ‘Grading 
Recommended’. 
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Figure D-6 Full Caseload Anomaly Graded Result List (ISS Sample) 
 
D.5 Graded Result Report (High Detail Report) 
 
The Anomaly Graded Result Report is a high-detail report containing all the details 
recorded and generated for a generalization group. This report concerns all the anomalous 
conditions relative to the observed anomalies within the group that served as the kernel 
for generalization. Users should use the drop-down menu to navigate to the desired 
generalization group to be shown in the report. The report (Figure D-7) begins with a 
summary of the observed anomalies within the generalization group, and then lists all the 
details for all anomalous conditions, including those that were NOT recommended for 
grading. 
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Figure D-7 Anomaly Graded Result Report (ISS Sample) 
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Appendix E -  Defining a Trending Basis 
 
Defining an appropriate trending basis is essential for meaningful trending. In this 
context, the trending basis can be considered to be the scale by which the data points in a 
trend are arranged. Simply trending occurrences with respect to a linear time-scale is not 
always appropriate as we will see in the following examples. 
 
E.1 Intermittent exposure 
 
NASA systems are typically highly complex involving numerous subsystems, many of 
which are only in use for limited periods of time when required; robotic manipulators, 
Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMUs), vehicle docking radar are all examples of 
subsystems that are only operational during specific periods of time. Subsystems such as 
these may only experience anomalies when they are operational, and not when dormant. 
If one were to conduct a trend of such a subsystem‟s anomaly occurrences with respect to 
continuous time, the trend shown would not be representative of real-world subsystem 
usage; the time-scale would include periods of time where the subsystem could not 
possibly experience an anomaly, which may result in a misleading trend. Within 
subsystems that are only operational intermittently, it is often useful to trend the 
anomalies with respect to the period of time in which it is vulnerable to the failure 
mechanism.  
 
Figure E-1 illustrates an intermittent exposure trend; the top chart shows a series of 
anomalies with respect to continuous time and the bottom chart shows the subsystem‟s 
usage profile (the period of time in which the subsystem is exposed to the failure 
mechanism). Combining the two into the chart on the right shows how the anomalies are 
represented along a usage scale, this shows a more meaningful representation of how 
often anomalies were experienced whilst the subsystem is exposed to the causal 
mechanism. 
 
 
Figure E-1 Intermittent Exposure Trending 
 
 
time
time
Usage profile Usage
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E.2 Continuous exposure 
 
Some systems and subsystems are constantly in operation and as such are continuously 
exposed to potential failure mechanisms that could result in an anomaly. Anomalies in 
components that are continuously exposed to the anomaly failure mechanism can be 
trended with respect to their absolute time of occurrence (e.g. ageing, wear-out of 
continuously-operated hardware). 
 
 
Figure E-2 Continuous Exposure Trending 
 
E.3 Demand exposure 
 
Many components within NASA systems are only functional on an instantaneous basis 
when they are demanded (e.g. release mechanisms, ignition sources, explosive bolts). 
Like the intermittently operated subsystems, the anomaly failure mechanism may only be 
exposed when the component is demanded, and cannot be produced at any other time. 
Anomaly occurrences within components that are only operational when demanded 
should be trended with respect to the demands made. In order to appropriately trend 
anomalies within such components the trending scale may be „normalized‟ with respect 
to the demands on the component.  
 
Figure E-3 demonstrates how a series of demands on a system results in a number of 
anomaly recurrences, the top chart depicts the anomalies with respect to continuous time 
and the bottom chart depicts the anomaly recurrences normalized into a demand exposure 
basis. The resultant trend may reveal previously undetected patterns; anomalies that at 
first appeared clustered together may become separated and anomalies that at first 
appeared at regular intervals may then become localized. Some entire systems (in 
particular, launch vehicles) that are not continuously operated but operated on a mission-
by mission basis can benefit from trending analyses that are normalized in this way (e.g. 
Space Transportation System and other reusable launch vehicles). 
 
 
time
Anomaly recurrences
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Figure E-3 Demand Exposure Trending 
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Appendix F -  Technical Basis for the Anomalous 
Condition Risk Index (ACRI) 
 
F.1 The ACRI Importance Measure 
 
Risk Modeling (in the context of APA) is performed to specifically measure the risk 
significance of the anomalous condition, and to do so in the context of a benchmark 
system risk (Ro).  The APA process defines the Anomaly Condition Risk Importance 
(ACRI) measure to assist in gauging and prioritizing anomalous conditions in terms of 
risk. ACRI is the conditional risk that is directly attributable to a failure mechanism 
occurring outside nominal bounds (thereby creating an anomalous condition). As its 
name implies, this risk metric is conditional, i.e. it presumes the anomalous condition 
exists. The ACRI is calculated as: 
 
oRonditionAnomalousCRiskonditionAnomalousCRiskACRI /)]|()|[(  
Equation 6 
 
The second term in the equation is needed to remove any stochastic risk that is 
represented in the model but not attributable to the anomaly, such as that due to random 
failures of modeled safety systems. This is done not only to isolate the risk that is directly 
attributable to the anomaly event, but also to remove the effects of variability in model 
scope. For example, a detailed model that includes all the components of a subsystem 
will typically show more risk than a subsystem model that is restricted to the components 
directly involved in the anomaly.  
 
In the case of ACRI, normalization with respect to the overall system risk allows the 
significance of anomalous conditions to be assessed relative to other risks in the system, 
which supports prioritization of risk management attention among competing issues. 
Particularly, higher ACRI values indicate a greater need for assurance activities in order 
to maintain baseline risk levels. It also provides a system-independent means for 
designating an anomaly as a precursor, in cases where precursor criteria are established. 
For example, an ACRI value of 1% or greater could be considered a reasonable basis for 
precursor designation. 
 
It is worth noting that ACRI is calculated using risks that are conditional on the 
occurrence of the anomalous condition. Therefore, when comparing measures across 
anomalous conditions, the probabilities of occurrence of the conditions are not taken into 
account. The measures have been defined in this way because anomaly investigation and 
precursor analysis are intrinsically pre-emptive, i.e. the intent is ideally to find and 
eliminate vulnerabilities upon their first manifestation. While this isn‟t necessarily 
achievable in all cases, it means that the measures will maintain their effectiveness in a 
data-lean environment, i.e. before many anomalies have occurred. 
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When a system risk model exists, the system risk Ro can be taken from the model. In 
cases where a system risk model does not exist, Ro must be obtained by other means in 
order to provide a normalization factor against which risk significance can be established. 
One possible basis for normalization, in the absence of a calculated risk, is the system 
risk requirement, which establishes a de facto acceptable risk. Note that assuming an Ro 
of 0 (meaning the system has absolutely no risk) leads to an ACRI of infinity – this 
makes sense since a system with no risk should not be experiencing anomalies in the first 
place. It is imperative that the same benchmark value of Ro be used in calculating ACRI 
for all anomalous conditions in a particular system, since this is a comparative measure 
that is intended for use in prioritizing the expenditure of resources to decrease system 
risk. Therefore, if the benchmark is updated, it should be applied retroactively to all 
previous ACRI estimates to ensure a common basis. 
 
F.2 Analytical Basis of ACRI 
 
If the total probability of failure of a system is denoted P(fail); let the condition where a 
specific anomalous condition exists be AC; and let the situation where a non-anomalous-
condition-related failure-causing condition exists in the system be Q. Note that although 
Q implies that failure is inevitable, it does not imply that the failure will necessarily be 
due to Q, since a system with both Q and AC might fail due to one or the other condition.  
By the law of total probability:  
 
)^()^|()^()^|(
)^()^|()^()^|()(
QACPQACfailPQACPQACfailP
QACPQACfailPQACPQACfailpfailP
 
Equation 7 
 
In principle, the risk attributable to the anomalous condition, conditional on its 
occurrence, is P(fail | AC  ¬Q). However, whereas it is practical to construct a risk 
model that allows the results to be conditioned on AC vs. ¬AC, it is not practical to 
construct a risk model that allows results to be conditioned on Q vs. ¬Q. Thus, the 
quantities that are amenable to calculation are:  
 
)()^|()()^|()|( QPQACfailPQPQACfailPACfailP  
Equation 8 
 
and  
 
)()^|()()^|()|( QPQACfailPQPQACfailPACfailP  
Equation 9 
 
Now, since Q implies failure, and ¬AC  ~Q implies success,  
 
1)^|()^|( QACfailPQACfailP  
Equation 10 
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and  
 
0)^|( QACfailP  
Equation 11 
 
Substituting Equations 9 and 10 into Equations 7 and 8 yields:  
 
)()^|()()|( QPQACfailPQPACfailP  
Equation 12 
 
and  
 
)()|( QPACfailP  
Equation 13 
 
Taking the difference yields:  
 
)()^|()|()|( QPQACfailPACfailPACfailP  
Equation 14 
 
Since the left hand side of Equation 13, divided by the benchmark system risk (Ro) is the 
definition of anomalous condition risk index (ACRI), we have:  
 
oR
QPQACfailP
ACRI
)()^|(
 
Equation 15 
The method for calculating ACRI accepts an error of P(¬Q) relative to P(fail | AC  ¬Q), 
which does not make a practical difference as long as P(~Q) is close to 1, i.e. as long as 
P(Q) << 1. This makes intuitive sense, because subtracting out the fraction of cases with 
condition Q also subtracts out those cases with condition Q  AC, some of which might 
fail due to AC. Thus the method undercounts failures due to AC in proportion to the 
fraction of total cases that have condition Q. 
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Appendix G -  Sample APA Results Reporting 
 
 
Figure G-1 Sample APA Results 
 
 
Figure G-2 Sample APA Results (Waterfall Chart) 
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APA process completed for 40 anomaly records
40
Anomalies
28 Evaluated
43
Anomalous
Conditions
15 
Graded
3
3
9
x Insufficient Information/Acceptance-Test/Non-Anomaly Records
Generalization
Grading
Of those 40 records, 28 anomalies were not screened from 
further evaluation
43 anomalous conditions created from 28 anomalies
15 recommended for grading
3 recommended for Risk Modeling
3 recommended for Observation & Trending
9 deemed low risk requiring no further analysis
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Figure G-3 Sample APA Results (Risk Modeling ACRI) 
 
 
Figure G-4 Sample APA Results (Process flow and Results of an Observed Anomaly) 
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